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In this paper we identify the main policy responses to the problem of regional
unemployment in Germany, Spain and Italy. The paper takes a broad perspective in
looking at the determinants of regional unemployment, the regional incidence of
national policies and the effects and efficiency of regional policies. In spite of the
very different situations and conditions in each country, there are a number of
conclusions and policy options to reduce regional unemployment which governments
and social partners should evaluate thoroughly. First, a stability-oriented
macroeconomic policy-mix with a sufficiently flexible labour market is a necessary,
although not sufficient condition for growth and employment at both national and
regional levels. Second, the collective wage bargaining systems should either be
decentralised de facto or should be complemented with easy-to-apply opt-outs at
regional or firm level, thus allowing account to be taken of local or firm-specific
conditions. Third, in order to avoid a long-term dependency of regions on fiscal
transfers, incentives need to be set in such a way as to achieve an adequate balance
between efficiency and equity. Fourth, the tax-benefit system should provide more
incentives to create and take up jobs since disincentives are a particularly relevant
problem for low-income regions. Fifth, pro-active regional policy expenditure on
physical and human capital is indispensable for the catching-up of poorer regions, and
the efficiency of these policies needs to be evaluated on a systematic and permanent
basis. Finally, the low level of geographic mobility in the three countries needs to be
addressed by a wide range of measures including greater regional differentiation of
both wages and the tax-benefit system, more flexibility of the housing market, a more
balanced use of fixed-term and permanent employment contracts as well as
improvements in the public employment services.Table of Contents
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1. Introduction
A major share of unemployment in the EU has a persistent geographical dimension. In
the 1990s the majority of unemployed in the EU15 lived in only three Member States:
Germany, Spain and Italy. As shown in Graph I.1, the share of these three countries in
total unemployment in the EU has increased from about 50% in 1991, when it roughly
matched their population share, to some 56% in 2000. In this decade, unemployment
increased in Germany and Italy, while it decreased considerably in Spain in the
second half of the 1990s. Within these countries, there is a considerable variation of
unemployment rates reaching from below 5% to over 20% (Graph I.2).
Unemployment is concentrated in the poorer Objective 1 regions, i.e. eastern
Germany, the South, centre and West of Spain as well as southern Italy which are the
f o c u so ft h i ss t u d y .
1 These regional imbalances indicate that one or several
mechanisms of adjusting this situation are not functioning in these three countries. It
is therefore of interest to study these cases in more detail to find out whether the same
problems are present and whether similar solutions could be applied.





















Source: DG ECFIN – AMECO database.
All chapters have a similar structure to allow for a stronger element of comparison.
They proceed by first looking at some stylised facts that help in understanding
regional unemployment in the country, then giving an overview of national and
regional policies and, finally, drawing some policy conclusions. The different
components of the analysis have a varying degree of importance in the three cases,
but all are relevant to each case study. Given the specific interest of many readers in
only the summary or one country case, each chapter was written with the objective to
make them readable without having to read all chapters. However, those readers who
1 To visualise these regions see map of regional unemployment in Europe at
http://inforegio.cec.eu.int/wbdoc/docoffic/official/report2/documents/map4.pdf.I nt h i ss t u d y ,p h a s i n g -
out Objective 1 regions are included except for economic accounts data for Germany given the lack of
separate data for east Berlin. Ceuta y Melilla are also sometimes excluded for Spain due to unreliable
data.2
read all chapters might notice some redundancies that are unavoidable given the
similarities of issues.
GRAPH I.2: Highest, lowest and average unemployment rates of NUTS 2 level regions in
















Source: Eurostat – Labour Force Survey.
2. Determinants of regional unemployment: some stylised facts
There are obvious differences in the emergence of regional unemployment between
Italy and Spain, on the one hand, and eastern Germany, on the other hand. In the
former cases geographic peripherality and distance from the main European markets
have always kept them in a weak position, while the latter has a rather central location
in Europe but the liberalisation shock due to German unification required the full
transformation of a regional economy. However, in each case, the mechanisms which
would usually be expected to allow adjustments to occur have not operated efficiently
enough, and this has led to large and persistent imbalances in regional unemployment
rates.
2.1 The economic development of the regions
In each of the three cases, high unemployment is accompanied by a low level of per
capita income. Therefore, the regions taken into account in the subsequent chapters
are generally the same as the Objective 1 regions of these Member States. Graph I.3
shows a strong negative correlation (of –0.76) between the regional difference to the
national average in GDP per capita and in unemployment. For example, the most
extreme case is Calabria in South Italy whose GDP per capita is 40 percentage points
below Italian average and whose unemployment rate is 17 percentage points above
Italian average. While one should be cautious in establishing a simple causal
relationship between these two variables, it can at least be said that both are an
expression of a lack of economic dynamism of low-income regions.3
GRAPH I.3: Differences of regions in Germany, Spain and Italy to national average of













2.2 Labour force qualifications
The regions under consideration tend to lag behind the national and EU average
attainment levels in terms of education and training, as well as in R&D. In spite of
considerable spending on education and training, these gaps have closed only very
slowly because it takes a long time before investment in human capital is reflected in
the attainment levels of the whole population. However, younger age groups often
already have comparable levels of qualifications, whereas older groups remain in a
position of being less skilled.
Nevertheless, it is not simply the case that unemployment rates are higher in these
regions due to lower skills levels, mostly due to the fact that young people with low
employment prospects stay longer in the education system. Indeed, there is some
evidence, particularly in Germany and Italy, that unemployed people have much
higher levels of qualifications in the Objective 1 regions than elsewhere. Statistically,
qualifications of the labour force are relatively higher in eastern Germany than in
western Germany. However, as for many other previously socialist countries, these
skills and knowledge may be outdated in market economies so that there is scarce
empirical evidence on the actual qualification of the labour force. In Southern Italy,
one third of people aged under 35 years with a university degree are unemployed,
although older age groups show the expected correlation between higher skills and
lower unemployment rates. This suggests that there is a lack of labour mobility
between regions and also that younger people may be ‘queuing’ for specific kinds of
jobs, often in the public sector. Thus, while investments in human capital may be
important in enhancing opportunities for more dynamic economic development, other
forms of intervention are also needed in order to stimulate employment creation. In
Spain, however, there is a higher correlation between unemployment rates over time
in provinces where skills are lower.4
2.3 Wages out of line with productivity
Regional differences in income and unemployment also persist because the wage
bargaining system fails to respond adequately to labour market conditions prevailing
at the regional, local and firm level. Because of regional differences in market access
and factor endowments, labour productivity varies across regions even when the same
technologies are applied. As a consequence, additional jobs are not created in low-
productivity regions because unit labour costs within a given sector with a nation-
wide wage floor would be overly high. These reservation wage floors, which may not
only arise from wage bargaining but also from minimum wages and the tax-benefit-
system, have an asymmetric effect in that they constrain job creation in low-
productivity regions while this is less relevant in high-productivity regions.
2
In the Objective 1 regions of Germany and Italy, nominal unit labour costs in all
sectors taken together are 5 to 10% above the national average (Table I.1). However,
in manufacturing (and some traded services), unit labour costs in low-productivity
regions are generally in line with the national average due to strong competition
which forces firms to adjust productivity to wages.
3 In high-unemployment regions of
Spain and Italy, relative unit labour costs hardly respond to changes in relative
unemployment.
4
TABLE I.1: Nominal unit labour costs in Objective 1 regions in total economy and in the
manufacturing sector, national average=100
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
total
Germany 139 126 115 112 114 111 111 112 112 111
Spain* :::: 9 9 1 0 0 1 0 0 :::
Italy :::: 1 0 4 1 0 5 1 0 4 1 0 5 ::
manufacturing
Germany 198 169 134 132 130 122 114 110 107 104
Spain :::: 9 9 9 9 1 0 0 9 9 ::
Italy :::: 9 6 9 9 9 9 9 9 ::
* Excluding agriculture and fishing
Source: Eurostat for Spain and Italy, Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”
for Germany; own calculations of unit labour costs as compensation per employee over
GVA/employment ratio; all original data based on ESA95 definitions.
The process underlying these adjustments is a major source of regional
unemployment. Nation-wide sectoral wage agreements force firms in sectors subject
to external competition to adjust labour productivity to the agreed nation-wide wage
level. In less dynamic regions, where productivity growth is slower than wage
2 Cf. Pench/ Sestito/ Frontini 1999.
3 In Italy and Spain, compensation per employee and GVA over employment in Objective 1 regions in
manufacturing are between 80% and 90% of the national average, while they are between 70% and
80% respectively in the case of eastern Germany.
4 Cf. Decressin et al. 2001, p.54.5
increases, adjustment generally occurs by means of labour-shedding, either by firing
the least productive workers, by closing down production plants or by increasing
capital-intensity. This adjustment process occurred in eastern Germany in the 1990s,
when one million jobs were lost in manufacturing, but the national average level of
unit labour costs was finally reached. Apart from this process of labour-shedding,
other adjustment strategies are also open to firms wishing to keep wages low, such as
leaving the wage bargaining system or moving to the informal economy.
In other sectors, in particular agriculture and non-traded services, unit labour costs
may diverge permanently from the national average for various reasons. There are
sector-specific methodological problems in calculating unit labour costs. For example,
high subsidies in agriculture may lead to relatively high levels of employment and
wages despite low productivity levels. Similarly, gross value added in the non-traded
service sector is generally calculated on the basis of wages, so that the measurement
of unit labour costs is not very meaningful. Moreover, distortions may be introduced
if employment is defined in terms of persons employed rather than in terms of hours
worked or full-time equivalents, particularly in sectors where part-time work is
important. To the extent that the divergence of regional unit labour costs from the
national average is not due to methodological problems, competitive pressures are
lower in some sectors so that wage increases can better be passed on in prices. This
may be of relevance for some non-traded services and may create problems of
competitiveness in other sectors where these services are needed as inputs.
2.4 Insufficient geographic labour mobility
The large regional differences in unemployment and job vacancies in these three
countries are not balanced by an equilibrating process of geographic mobility. A mix
of various factors contributes to the low degree of labour mobility, ranging from
rigidities in the labour and housing markets to cultural differences between regions.
The main explanation is that migration depends mainly on the expected difference in
real disposable income less the transaction (and social) costs of migration. Hence,
people migrate only if they expect an increase in purchasing power taking into
account the costs of moving, local prices, taxation, social transfers etc. The design of
the tax-benefit system and the functioning of the housing market therefore strongly
affect the propensity to move. Looking at Table I.2, the most striking observation is
the extremely low share of internal migration in Spain and Italy, the latter being the
lowest of all OECD countries for which data are available.
A first important factor is the lack of regional differentiation in terms of wages, taxes
and benefits, which means that there are only small differences in interregional levels
of real disposable income. In particular, wage setting systems and benefits rarely take
account of regional differences in the cost of living. As living costs tend to be lower
in poorer regions, taking a job in a richer region may not necessarily improve a
household’s income situation in real terms. Moreover, weaknesses in the tax-benefit
system such as in Italy may reinforce people’s dependence on family networks and
reduce their willingness to migrate to another region.6


















Greece 4.7 : :
Spain 11.7 0.60 1
France 18.4 1.49 5
Italy 9.4 0.50 2
Netherlands 4.9 1.61 8




Finland :0 . 9 23
Sweden 19.3 1.61 :
United Kingdom 19.3 2.30
(1998)
17
Australia 5.6 1.93 :
Canada 6.7 2.15 9
Czech Republic 12.2 0.55 5
Hungary :1 . 4 72
Japan 13.0 2.45 :
New Zealand 6.6 1.99
(1996)
:
USA 16.7 2.22 3
Note: Data are mainly from labour force surveys and for OECD-defined level 2 regions (which are the
NUTS level 2 regions for EU Member States).
Source: OECD 2000.
Second, housing markets in the three countries are rather rigid due to strong levels of
regulation and high transaction costs (including taxes), and this creates problems for
people wishing to move from one place to another. Spain (78%) and Italy (68%) have
rather high shares of owner-occupied housing, not least because of the strong
regulation of private rented accommodation
5. Transaction costs associated with house
purchases are around 7-10% of the house price (Graph I.4), and probably prevent
many unemployed people from buying a house in order to move to a city where there
are insufficient houses for rent. In Germany, where privately rented housing accounts
for about one third of all accommodation, rents are extremely high in some major
cities because strong regulation means that there are limited incentives to increase the
supply of rented houses.
Third, widespread use of fixed-term contracts may inhibit labour mobility between
regions due to their lower level of job security. Fixed-term contracts are widely used
in Spain (while the use of fixed-term contracts is still only limited in Italy) due to the
rigidities associated with permanent employment contracts in terms of severance
payments. Workers on fixed-term contracts may also experience difficulties in
obtaining mortgages for house purchases, so that the prevalence of such contracts may
interact with rigidities in the rented housing market to deter labour mobility.
5 Cf. Maclennan et al. 2000, p.17. Figures are from around 1990; for Germany it is only 38%.7






















Source: Maclennan/ Muellbauer/ Stephens 2000, available at www.housingoutlook.co.uk ; data from
Woolwich Building Society.
Fourth, job-matching mechanisms seem less than effective in both Spain and Italy.
Tailored advisory services for unemployed people are still not provided systematically
by Italy’s public employment service. Moreover, in both countries, the
decentralisation of the public employment service – while it is certainly useful in
improving access to information at the local level - involves the risk that unemployed
people will be provided with insufficient information about employment opportunities
in other regions due to a lack of inter-regional co-ordination and information.
Finally, cultural aspects may also play a role in reducing labour mobility. In Italy and
Spain, family networks remain strong, thus reducing young people’s willingness to
move far from other family members. Moreover, just as low international mobility in
Europe is partly explained by differences in language and culture, interregional
mobility may also be limited by such factors, although to a lesser degree. It may be
the case that in larger countries with strong regional differences, there may be some
kind of discrimination against people who do not use the local accent, dialect or even
language. However, due to the availability of only anecdotal evidence, this aspect is
not mentioned in the country chapters.
3. Regional incidence of national policies
The importance of national policies in setting the basic economic and institutional
context for regional development is clear in each of the three countries. Sound
macroeconomic policies are of fundamental importance in providing the basis for
economic growth and employment creation. However, particularly in countries with
strong regional disparities in fiscal capacity, tensions may emerge between the core
policy objective of maintaining balanced public finances and a number of other policy
aims. Thus it may be difficult for countries to continue to achieve relatively equal
levels of per capita household consumption and equal access to public services across
regions, particularly given the desirability in these countries of reducing levels of
taxation, particularly on labour, and maintaining levels of public investment in areas
such as human, knowledge and physical capital. The national policy context is also
important in terms of the regulation of markets, as a greater degree of flexibility in8
labour and housing markets can assist in employment creation by facilitating
adjustments through wage differentiation and labour mobility across regions.
3.1 Macroeconomic policies
The three countries underline the importance of sound macroeconomic policies for
both national and regional growth of income and employment. An unbalanced policy-
mix in the first half of the 1990s has contributed to a period of weak growth (Graph
I.5). The second half of the 1990s saw a good performance in GDP growth and
employment in Spain and Italy also due to the success in stabilising the economy in
preparation for EMU. While causalities are certainly more complex, it is clear that the
policy-mix of an adequate monetary policy, a reduction of budgetary deficits and
wage moderation have at least provided the basis for several years of employment
growth in all three countries. However, employment growth was much stronger in
Spain than in Germany and Italy due to higher growth and more progress in labour
market reform in Spain. In Germany, the major demand stimulus from German
monetary union and the deficit-financed increase in public spending in the years
following unification soon proved to be not sustainable and contributed to weak GDP
growth in the rest of the 1990s, not least due to the necessary adjustment of the
construction sector and a slow adjustment of the rather rigid labour market.
GRAPH I.5: Employment (annual change in %), consumer price index (CPI, annual
change in %) and budget deficit (in % of GDP), 1991-2000
Note: Deficit figures in 2000 including one-off proceeds relative to the allocation of UMTS licences
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3.2 Interpersonal redistribution and fiscal transfers
High levels of unemployment in specific regions tends to mean that levels of
interpersonal redistribution are high between regions, with lower per capita tax
revenues and higher per capita welfare payments in regions with high unemployment
rates. While such transfers may be deemed necessary on the grounds of equity, they
can have implications for public sector finances due to their impact on public sector
indebtedness and tax rates. There is also a risk that high levels of interpersonal
redistribution to high-unemployment regions may lead to economic dependence.
Interpersonal redistribution remains the most important source of interregional
redistribution, mainly through the revenue side due to the progressiveness of taxation,
whereas public expenditure does not clearly favour poorer regions. These transfers
mean that there is a significant difference between regional demand (measured in
terms of the aggregate absorption of households, firms and the government) and
regional production (measured in terms of GDP). This disparity between demand and
production gives rise to an import surplus (equal to public transfers and capital flows),
which in eastern Germany amounted to 46% of regional GDP, and in southern Italy
amounted to 12% of regional GDP in 1999
6. In these two countries, the difference
between demand and production in the poorer regions has contributed to a high tax
burden where the total revenues of general government were around 47% relative to
GDP in the second half of the 1990s, whereas they remained below 40% in Spain.
On the one hand, there is a risk that high levels of consumption spending may create
difficulties for policy-makers in maintaining balanced budgets, particularly if they are
also attempting to reduce taxes and to ensure relatively strong levels of public
investment with the aim of stimulating long-run growth. In Italy in the 1970s and
1980s, the increases in public sector and household consumption, to a degree not
justified by fiscal capacity, were a key reason for the strong rise in the overall tax
burden and public sector indebtedness.
On the other hand, given that most regional public expenditure is related to
consumption and does not therefore directly raise the productive capacity of the
poorer regions, there is a risk that these regions may become economically dependent
on state transfers rather then developing their own strategies for regional
development.
3.3 Functioning of markets
All three countries have introduced some labour market reforms in recent years and
these appear to have had some positive effects on employment creation although
employment growth has tended to be stronger in the richer regions. However, as
outlined above, a major problem for more employment in low-productivity regions
are the relatively uniform wage levels across regions. Therefore, further action is
6 Cf. Sinn/ Westermann 2001.10
needed in specific areas, particularly in order to allow a greater degree of wage
differentiation across regions.
There are various ways in which wage bargaining systems and agreements could take
better account of regional differences in productivity. One option would be to allow
the effective decentralisation of the bargaining system to the regional or firm level,
while a second option would be to introduce more flexibility into sector-wide
agreements. Greater regional wage differentiation can also be achieved by means of
mechanisms which take into account the fact that equal wages in nominal terms mean
that real wages differ across regions. This is because regional income and price levels
tend to be positively correlated, in particular with regard to housing.
A coefficient to correct for regional differences in costs of living, with the public
sector possibly functioning as a role model, might provide better incentives for the
spatial allocation of activities. The European Communities, for example, have such a
system in place which applies a correction coefficient to the salaries of staff working
in Member States other than Belgium and Luxembourg (see Annex I for further
details). The methodological problems of estimating and applying regional purchasing
power parities should not be too difficult to overcome given that in several Member
States a major share of public administration is undertaken by regional governments.
Taking Germany as an example, it should be technically feasible to install such a
system given that most of the public sector is run by the Länder. Moreover one
component of public sector wages is a location allowance (“Ortszulage”) which has
however lost its original purpose of regional differentiation so that it now only
depends on family status and no longer on the duty station. In Spain, some
Comunidades Autonómas pay higher wages in public services under their sole
responsibility, such as education.
4. Effects and efficiency of regional policies
Two main types of regional policy are applied in the three countries: first, fiscal
transfers to poorer regions and, second, targeted forms of intervention, notably
investment in physical and human capital. While in the former case it is important that
equalisation or transfer mechanisms are well-designed in order to maintain a balance
between equity and efficiency, the impact of the latter depends on the effectiveness of
both strategy-building and implementation.
4.1 Explicit fiscal transfers to regions
In all three cases there are more or less explicit schemes of interregional fiscal
equalisation. Germany has the most developed scheme, while in Spain a process of
fiscal decentralisation is on-going and a scheme is slowly being phased in in Italy that
will be fully working in 2014. Discussions and reforms of these schemes are
characterised by the difficulty in achieving a balance between efficiency and equity,
i.e. in consolidating richer regions’ objective of more fiscal autonomy by keeping a
higher share of what they produced and the poorer regions’ objective of offering their
population the same quality of public services which other regions enjoy. On the one11
hand, if the balance were too much towards equity, fiscal decentralisation would lead
to strong disincentive effects in that both richer and poorer regions would lose in
fiscal terms if they improved their economic performance. On the other hand, if the
balance were too much towards efficiency the poorer regions would have problems in
financing public investment required for their process of catching-up and providing
their citizens with an adequate level of public service.
Furthermore, there is often an imbalance between fiscal decentralisation of
expenditure and revenue. While decentralisation is usually more advanced on the
expenditure side, it is less so on the revenue side. For the latter, there is often a
sharing of revenue of one tax between different tiers of government which tends to
lead to low fiscal responsibility due to a lack of clear competencies and of tax
competition between regions.
4.2 Regional policy expenditure
Each country has extensive regional policy instruments which provide investment in
human, knowledge and physical capital, as well as incentives to private investment.
These instruments are broadly modelled on, and co-financed by, the EU’s Structural
Funds, while Spain also receives finance from the Cohesion Fund. In Germany and
Italy, there are also other region-specific instruments, for example employment
subsidies and work provision schemes.
Evaluations of the macroeconomic effects of Structural Funds programmes in
Germany and Spain indicate that public investment in human and physical capital can
have a significant impact on the growth of income and employment. This is despite
the fact that these types of public expenditure are very low in comparison with
spending aimed at raising levels of household consumption and providing general
public services.
Other types of regional policy expenditure are often less effective, notably spending
on state aids, which account for a large share of regional funding in Germany and
Italy. Although regional state aids in these countries have decreased in recent years
and are now comparable to other Member States if expressed relative to GDP (Graph
I.6), the amounts a private investor can receive are considerable and have a distorting
effect in biasing towards highly capital-intensive productions. The size of dead-
weight effects is difficult to determine, but some estimates suggest that considerable
shares of private investment would have been undertaken in the absence of subsidies.
Moreover, the effectiveness of proactive regional policy instruments depends on the
extent to which they are guided by a consistent long-term, strategic approach, are
designed appropriately, and are implemented efficiently. The effectiveness of regional
policy in southern Italy has been reduced by the numerous changes in strategy and in
policy-making institutions.12
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Source: European Commission 2001, Tables A6/1 to A6/16.
Further problems derive from weaknesses in the design of policies as it is necessary to
ensure that investment is concentrated on the projects likely to have the greatest
impact on growth and employment. Therefore, assistance should prioritise removing
bottlenecks in the growth poles within the lagging regions rather than spreading the
money evenly across the territory which usually has little effect. In eastern Germany,
active labour market policies have often been used to reduce unemployment
temporarily (e.g. by means of employment subsidies and public works), rather than to
provide unemployed people with the skills and information required for finding work.
A more targeted approach is necessary, so that such policies are designed to meet
specific labour market needs and are focused on specific groups with particular
requirements.
Finally, the effectiveness of regional policy can be undermined by inefficiencies in
the implementation process. This may be due to complex bureaucratic procedures
within the public administration, or to the lack of appropriate capacities and skills, for
example for project selection, monitoring and evaluation. Sometimes, however, the
effectiveness of regional policy may be undermined by the mismanagement of funds
and corruption.
5. Conclusions and policy options
In spite of the very different situations and conditions in each country, there are a
number of conclusions and policy options which governments and social partners
should evaluate thoroughly with the aim of reducing the persistence of regional
unemployment:
1. A stability-oriented macroeconomic policy-mix with a sufficiently flexible labour
market is a necessary, although not sufficient condition for growth and
employment at both national and regional levels.13
2. The collective wage bargaining systems should either be decentralised de facto or
should be complemented with easy-to-apply opt-outs at regional or firm level,
thus allowing account to be taken of local or firm-specific conditions. An
interesting option could be to introduce regional correction coefficients in public
sector wages and in the benefits system in order to take account of regional
differences in costs of living.
3. Regions with low levels of income per capita require considerable fiscal transfers
to allow for similar levels of private and public consumption within a nation. In
order to avoid long-term dependency, incentives need to be set in such a way as to
achieve an adequate balance between efficiency and equity, i.e. to provide the
poorer regions with the conditions required for their economic development and to
offer their population a similar quality of public services which other regions
enjoy.
4. The tax-benefit system should provide more incentives to create and take up jobs.
Since disincentives are a particular problem at the lower end of productivity and
wages, it is an especially relevant problem for low-income regions.
5. Pro-active regional policy expenditure on physical and human capital is
indispensable for the catching-up of poorer regions. This requires the ongoing
evaluation of efficiency and of long-term impacts, although the focus of
evaluation should not be short-term employment effects. Within the assisted
regions, funding should be spatially concentrated on areas where the largest
impact can be expected in order to trigger a self-sustained process of
development. Of particular importance is the design of institutions for channelling
funds to the final beneficiary. Subsidies to private investment in the poorer
regions tend not to be very efficient as they suffer from dead-weight effects, create
a prisoners’ dilemma in that every region is worse off in the competition for
mobile capital through subsidies and tend to favour extremely capital-intensive
forms of production. This may create a dualistic structure of small labour-
intensive local firms and large capital-intensive firms.
6. The low level of geographic mobility in the three countries needs to be addressed
by a wide range of measures. Greater regional differentiation in real terms should
be encouraged in terms of both wages and the tax-benefit system. It would also be
desirable to consider the ways in which the tax-benefit system interacts with
family networks, and to make any necessary adjustments. Moreover, efforts
should be made to increase the flexibility of the housing market by reducing
transaction costs on house purchases and by enhancing incentives for housing
supply. Mobility in Spain might also be encouraged by greater use of permanent
employment contracts (which at present are unattractive to employers due to
stringent firing conditions), as fixed-term contracts are less likely to enable people
to move from one region to another. Finally, improvements may be needed in job-
matching mechanisms, particularly in the public employment service’s provision
of information about employment opportunities in other regions.14
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ANNEXI
The correction coefficient applied by the European Communities
7
Article 64 of the Staff Regulations for officials of the European Communities
stipulates:
“An official's remuneration expressed in euros shall, after the compulsory deductions
set out in these Staff Regulations or in any implementing regulations have been made,
be weighted at a rate above, below or equal to 100%, depending on living conditions
in the various places of employment. These weightings shall be adopted by the
Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission …”
A correction coefficient operates as a percentage adjustment to the salary to
compensate for the difference (positive or negative) in the cost of living in the duty
station as compared with Brussels. The coefficient is calculated by Eurostat by using
prices surveyed in the context of measuring purchasing power parities. Prices are
weighted according to a basket of goods and services of average official’s expenditure
which is estimated from a “Family Budget Survey” among EC staff taking place
roughly every five years.
For euro area countries the correction coefficient is the average price ratio (or
economic parity) expressed as a percentage. For the countries outside the euro area
(Denmark, Sweden and UK) an exchange rate must be used to express the average
price ratio (or economic parity) as a percentage (or correction coefficient). Of course
for the system to work, the same rate must be used to convert the salary from euro
into local currency. To avoid recalculating the correction coefficient every month, the
salary conversion rate is fixed annually. The two examples and the graph below
explain the mechanism more in detail.
Example 1 (euro countries)
Suppose that the average basket of goods and services costs 240 euro in the duty
station and 200 euro in Brussels. The price ratio (or economic parity) is therefore
240/200 = 1.2. That means that a salary of 1200 euro is needed to have the same
purchasing power as with a 1000 euro salary in Brussels. In other words, to maintain
the purchasing power in the duty station one would need a 20% higher salary than in
Brussels. A correction coefficient of 120 is applied to the salary expressed in euro, to
guarantee the same purchasing power.
Example 2 (non-euro countries)
Suppose that the average basket of goods and services costs 600 local currency units
(LCU) in your duty station and 200 euro in Brussels. The price ratio (or economic
parity) is therefore 600/200 = 3.0. That means that a 3000 LCU salary is needed to
7 Information in this annex has been taken from a Eurostat brochure which is available to Commission
staff.16
have the same purchasing power as with a 1000 euro salary in Brussels. If the fixed
exchange rate applied to the remuneration were 2.5 LCU/euro, a correction coefficient
of 120 (=100 X 3.0/2.5) would be applied to the salary expressed in euro to bring the
salary up to 3.000 (=1000 X 120/100 x 2.5). If the exchange rate were 2.4 LCU per
Euro, the correction coefficient would have to be 125 (=100 x 3.0/2.4) to bring the
salary up to 3.000 (=1000 X 125/100 x 2.5) Thus, the value of the exchange rate
modifies the correction coefficient without affecting the purchasing power in the duty
station or net salary in LCU. Hence, a fixed exchange rate is used to avoid having to
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Belgium/Luxembourg 100.0 1 EUR
Denmark 133.0 7.4470 DKK
Germany 105.1 1 EUR
except: Bonn 98.3 1 EUR
Karlsruhe 95.8 1 EUR
München 108.4 1 EUR
Greece 87.2 1 EUR
Spain 95.3 1 EUR
France 117.8 1 EUR
Irland 122.1 1 EUR
Italy 103.1 1 EUR
except: Varese 95.6 1 EUR
Netherlands 115.2 1 EUR
Austria 108.5 1 EUR
Portugal 88.6 1 EUR
Finland 122.1 1 EUR
Sweden 116.6 9.1925 SEK
United Kingdom 164.0 0.6035 GBP
except: Culham 132.0 0.6035 GBP17
II. EASTERN GERMANY
1. Introduction
Within Germany, the unemployment situation differs considerably between its eastern
and its western part.
8 In 2000, there were on average 1.36 million unemployed people
in eastern Germany and 2.53 million unemployed in western Germany, and there were
22 and 6 unemployed per vacancy respectively (Table II.1). Furthermore, there were
about 800,000 people in “hidden” unemployment in eastern Germany in 2000, so that
the total number of registered and hidden unemployed in eastern Germany amounted
to 2.16 million.
9 In November 2001, the unemployment rate stood at 7.4% in western
Germany whereas it was 16.9% in eastern Germany. These averages conceal
variations in unemployment rates in labour office districts of between 2.7% in
Freising/Bayern and 22.6% in Neubrandenburg/Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Thus,
within the same country there are regions with extreme labour shortages and others
with almost a quarter of the labour force without job.
TABLE II.1: Labour market situation in eastern and western Germany in 2000 (in 1000)
East West total
civilian labour force (1) 7,806.1 32,504.9 40,311.0
unemployed (2) 1,359.3 2,529.4 3,888.7
vacancies (3) 62.1 451.9 514.0
unemployment rate in % (2/1) 17.4 7.8 9.6
unemployed/vacancy (3/2) 21.9 5.6 7.6
Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit.
The radical transformation of the east German economy after the collapse of the GDR
has obviously affected the labour market. Between 1991 and 2000, eastern Germany
lost more than 700,000 in population and more than 910,000 in employment (Table
II.2). The ratio of employment to total population fell from above 46% to 42%, almost
6 percentage points less than in western Germany.
While a “J-curve” of economic activity and employment in the first years after an
economy has suffered an external shock does not come as a surprise, the persistence
of differences in regional unemployment between western and eastern Germany was
more unexpected. This is all the more given that the employment situation improved
considerably in western Germany from 1998 to 2000 whereas the situation in the east
8 Note that there are different statistical concepts of eastern Germany due to the specific situation of
Berlin. In labour market statistics west Berlin is attributed to western Germany and east Berlin to east
Germany. In economic accounts, however, following the revision of the methodology (to “ESA95” by
the Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”), there is no longer a division of
Berlin so that a choice is to be made as to which part of Germany Berlin is statistically attributed. Here,
given the dominance of the west Berlin economy, Berlin as a whole is attributed to western Germany.
9 Sachverständigenrat 2000 p.126. “Hidden” unemployed are those in labour market policy schemes on
reduced working time, job creation, training, reduced working ability and early retirement.18
German Länder at best stabilised. The paper proceeds by first looking at some stylised
facts that help in understanding unemployment in eastern Germany, then giving an
overview of national and regional policies and, finally, drawing some policy
conclusions.
TABLE II.2: Population and employment (annual average in 1000), 1991 and 2000
population employment employment/population (in %)
1991 2000* difference 1991 2000 difference 1991 2000 difference
Brandenburg 2,562.0 2600 38.0 1,186.9 1045.2 -141.7 46.3 40.2 -6.1
M.-Vorpommern 1,907.7 1786 -121.7 845.6 750.6 -95.0 44.3 42.0 -2.3
Sachsen 4,721.6 4452 -269.6 2,240.5 1963.8 -276.7 47.5 44.1 -3.3
Sachsen-Anhalt 2,849.1 2641 -208.1 1,274.1 1052.3 -221.8 44.7 39.8 -4.9
Thüringen 2,591.4 2445 -146.4 1,237.9 1061.8 -176.1 47.8 43.4 -4.3
East Germany 14,631.8 13,924.0 -707.8 6,785.0 5,873.7 -911.3 46.4 42.2 -4.2
West Germany 65,352.4 68219 2,866.6 31,669.0 32656.6 987.6 48.5 47.9 -0.6
Germany 79,984.2 82,143.0 2,158.8 38,454.0 38,530.3 76.3 48.1 46.9 -1.2
*p r o v i s i o n a l
Source: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”.
2. Determinants of regional unemployment in eastern Germany: some
stylised facts
Unification has brought about a major shock to the east German economy which
required its full transformation in order to regain competitiveness. While the implied
structural change inevitably went along with the destruction of many jobs, several
mechanisms have prevented the creation of an equal number of jobs and this
contributed to the persistence of unemployment. Economic growth was impressive in
the first half of the 1990s but remained below west German rates in the second half.
Convergence thus came to a halt and so did employment growth. The qualification of
the labour force is comparable to - or even better than in - western Germany although
it is not clear to what extent some skills are system-specific and have become obsolete
in a market economy. A major barrier to more investment and jobs was the rapid
process of convergence of wages to west German levels which brought wages out of
line with productivity and induced cuts in employment. Furthermore, those who have
become unemployed have insufficient incentives to geographic labour mobility
towards areas where jobs vacancies are available.
2.1 The economic development of eastern Germany
Employment is usually strongly linked to the overall economic performance of a
country or a region. GDP growth in eastern Germany was higher than in western
Germany until 1996 and has been slightly lower or equal since then (Graph II.1). As a
consequence, GDP per capita relative to western Germany increased from 40% in
1991 to 62% in 1996 and more or less stagnated at that level from then on.19
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Source: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”; own calculations.
Economic growth in eastern Germany had a specific sectoral pattern in that it was
strongly driven by an expansion of the construction sector which contracted in the
second half of the 1990s, following a reduction in fiscal incentives for housing
investment, and thus contributed to a subdued growth in these years (Graph II.2 and
Table II.3). In 2000, the construction sector’s share of gross value added (GVA) in the
eastern Länder was still more than double its share in the old Länder. In contrast, the
manufacturing sector had rather high growth rates throughout the 1990s, although this
must be seen in the light of the very low starting level resulting from the almost
complete collapse of industry after its exposure to external competition. The share of
industry in total GVA in eastern Germany is still more than 7 percentage points below
its share in western Germany. Lower growth rates than in the west are present in most
service sectors with the exception of the public service.



























Source: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”.20
TABLE II.3: Change in GVA in % (constant 1995 prices) in the new Länder (excl.
Berlin), 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
agriculture, forestry, fishery -19.8 35.6 -12.3 13.1 3.5 6.5 10.4 3.7 -0.6
industry (excl. construction) -5.8 14.6 12.3 6.4 9.2 3.9 3.9 2.7 7.5
-o fw h i c h :m a n u f a c t u r i n g 1.3 19.6 20.8 8.5 7.5 9.3 5.5 3.3 8.3
construction 31.6 17.2 22.4 2.6 -1.5 -3.8 -10.5 -4.3 -9.7
trade, tourism, transport 16.7 13.1 10.8 2.5 1.9 0.7 3.6 2.7 1.5
finance, housing, business
services 10.0 17.0 13.7 10.8 8.0 7.2 7.2 5.0 5.0
public and other private services 8.3 3.8 6.0 2.3 1.4 -0.4 -0.2 0.1 0.8
total 9.5 12.0 11.3 4.9 3.6 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.7
Source: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”.
A further dimension of growth in eastern Germany is its regional pattern which is
becoming increasingly differentiated (Box II.1). A cluster analysis carried out by the
German Council of Economic Experts in 1999 identified Leipzig, Dresden,
Halle/Saale, Jena, Erfurt, Chemnitz and Berlin (including Potsdam) as the main
growth poles in eastern Germany.
10 These regions are well equipped in terms of the
growth determinants taken into account in the analysis, i.e. high productivity based on
a favourable sectoral structure with many high value added, technology-intensive
activities and a low share of agriculture, a high share of qualified employees, a low
degree of industrial specialisation, a high population density as well as a low distance
to other agglomerations. The explanation provided is that the proximity of firms,
universities and research institutes allowed the exploitation of knowledge spill-overs
and access to a pool of qualified employees.
BOX II.1: EMERGING INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS IN EASTERN GERMANY
Three industries had a rather strong, spatially concentrated development in eastern Germany:
microelectronics, chemicals, automobiles. In all three cases there is a certain tradition from the pre-war
and GDR periods which is important with regard to the availability of skilled labour. At the same time,
many of them strongly depend on input and output linkages so that clustering is a useful strategy for
being close to suppliers, costumers and skilled labour. These industries are all very capital-intensive
which reduces the importance of labour costs and is a consequence of the generous subsidisation of
productive investment in eastern Germany.
Microelectronics
The electronics industry is among the industries with the strongest growth of production in eastern
Germany and has doubled from 1995 to 1999. In 1998, about 34,000 were employed in this industry, or
6% of all employees in the manufacturing sector. A particular specialisation is in microelectronics
which had already been developed in the GDR with about 120,000 employees, including a research
centre for microelectronics in Dresden and semiconductor production plants in four locations (Erfurt,
Dresden, Frankfurt/Oder and Neuhaus/Thüringen). Following the closing down or privatisation of these
plants during the 1990s, Dresden (capital of Sachsen) developed a cluster of microelectronics with
currently around 500 companies with more than 20,000 employees working directly in
microelectronics or indirectly in related branches. Production plants of major companies include
Infineon (a Siemens affiliate), AMD (Advanced Micro Devices) and ZMD (Dresden Centre for
Microelectronics). Furthermore, there are 15 independent research institutes and more than 150
software offices active in this sector in Dresden. Intel is considering locating a production plant for
semiconductors in Frankfurt/Oder (Brandenburg).
10 Sachverständigenrat 1999, pp. 116 ff. See also Blien et al. 2001.21
Chemicals
The east German chemical industry underwent the most intense restructuring after unification. Only in
1997 did employment increase again for the first time and has remained since then at a level of 32,000.
The so-called “chemicals triangle” has a number of locations, most of which are in Sachsen-Anhalt
and in basic materials including hydrogenation (Rodeleben), nitrogen products (Piesteritz), chlorine,
phosphorus and silicon chemistry (Bitterfeld/Wolfen), olefins (Buna), refinery and petrochemicals
(Leuna). The most important location is the “ChemiePark Bitterfeld/Wolfen” where there are 3,600
direct jobs in the chemical industry and another 7000 indirect jobs. The production there is rather
capital-intensive with an investment per job of about • 500,000. It is a traditional chemical industry
location which was founded at the end of the 19
th century on the basis of exploitation of brown coal
which however no longer exists today. The advantages of this cluster in Bitterfeld/Wolfen are best
illustrated by the common utilities for energy and waste as well as a closed product flow cycle for
synthetic quartz glass production on the basis of co-operation between different plants.
Automobiles
The production of automobiles was one of the most dynamic industries in eastern Germany after
unification, with investment by car producers and input suppliers adding up to more than • 5 billion.
This dynamism was supported by rather early decisions to stop the production of the GDR brands
“Trabant” and “Wartburg”, which were not competitive in terms of quality, and the investment
decisions for highly productive production plants by Volkswagen (in Mosel and Chemnitz in Sachsen)
and Opel (in Eisenach in Thüringen). This allowed them to make use of the available resources at these
locations whose tradition goes back to the predecessors of Audi and BMW at the beginning of the 20th
century. At present there are about 30,000 employees producing more than 400,000 cars per year in
eastern Germany, which is about 8% of the domestic production of German car producers. Further
investments which have recently started or will soon start production are DaimlerChrysler in
Ludwigsfelde (Brandenburg), Porsche in Leipzig (Sachsen) and a transparent factory for assembling a
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production site in Leipzig at investment costs of about • 1 billion, creating 5,000 direct jobs in the
medium term and an estimated 5,000 indirect jobs. Leipzig had been chosen after a long selection
process among applications from more than 250 cities and regions. The main arguments in favour of
Leipzig had been the proximity to the BMW plants in Bavaria, the good infrastructure, the subsidies to
be expected (28% of the investment), the availability of skilled labour, and a flexible working time
scheme. The latter was agreed with BMW’s workers council so that machines will be running between
60 and 140 hours per week while individual workers’ time will be accounted on a medium-term basis
without any payments for overtime or wage bill reductions in low-activity periods with less than the
regular 38 hours per week.
2.2 The qualification of the labour force
Statistically, the qualifications of the labour force are relatively higher in eastern
Germany than in western Germany. In the West in 1999, 18.8% of all employed had
no formal qualifications while only 11.9% fell into this category in the East (Graph
II.3). Similarly, of all unemployed, 36.8% in the West and 11.9% in the East had no
qualification. However, as for many other previously socialist countries, there is a
scarcity of empirical evidence on the actual qualifications of the labour force. This is
mostly due to the fact that, in spite of a high level of formal education, a major part of
skills and knowledge were system-specific and are now obsolete – in particular those
in social sciences including management skills, but also in some technical professions
- and are therefore of little use in today’s market economies. This adds to mostly
anecdotal evidence, which is difficult to distinguish from unjustified prejudices, that22
people in previously socialist countries tend to have passive attitudes in relying on the
government to provide solutions to their economic and social problems.
11
GRAPH II.3: Qualifications of employed and unemployed in eastern and western
Germany in % of total, 1999
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The functional structure of employment in eastern Germany tends to confirm a lower
level of skills since it differs from the one in western Germany in mainly two aspects
(Graph II.4). First, there is a much higher share of employment in production and
construction activities (about 5 percentage points). Second, a lower share works in
data processing (about 3 percentage points) and in research and design (by about 2
11 See e.g. Pohl 2000, p.23323
percentage points). While this structure is mostly the outcome of a sectoral structure
dominated by many SMEs, on the one hand, and fewer large firms whose
headquarters are located elsewhere, on the other hand, there might also be a certain
degree of reverse causality in that it might be difficult to find qualified staff for more
high value added jobs. This is also confirmed by low private R&D expenditure,
although it has increased considerably in the 1990s. Indeed, many authors attribute the
lack of competitiveness of firms in eastern Germany to problems of marketing,
technology and innovation.
12
2.3 Wages out of line with productivity
One of the main handicaps for growth and employment in eastern Germany has been
the fast rise of wages beyond productivity increases. Wage convergence in collective
agreements had the consequence of high unit labour costs relative to western
Germany due to wages of about 13% above productivity on average since 1996
(Graph II.5). In 2000, compensation per employee had a level of 77% and GDP over
employment a level of 68% relative to the west German level respectively. This holds
in spite of an average weekly working time of 38.9 hours in 1999, compared to 36.8
hours in western Germany. Among the reasons for the low labour productivity in
eastern Germany are a lower capital intensity due to different relative factor prices, a
lower use of production capacities and the need for many east German firms to
compete through lower prices.
13
GRAPH II.5: Compensation, productivity and nominal unit labour costs in eastern
Germany (current prices, western Germany = 100), 1991-2000
49
62
69 73 75 76 76 76 77 77
35
48















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
compensation per employee GDP/employment
nominal unit labour costs
Source: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”; own calculations.
12 See e.g. Landeszentralbank Berlin-Brandenburg 2001, p.24ff.
13 Cf. Sachverständigenrat 2000, p.186f.24
The wage developments in eastern Germany are the outcome of many forces
preventing wages from developing in line with productivity. The initial situation of
the German monetary union and unification is crucial in understanding the process in
the 1990s. While the 1:1 conversion rate of the GDR Mark to the deutschmark is often
said to have been the main problem, this does not seem to be the case given that
wages in the east were only about one third of those in the west and therefore
basically corresponding to differences in productivity. More important was the
situation of wage bargaining agreed in many sectors in 1991, namely that wages
would convergence to western levels within five years. Those negotiations were
mainly carried out by employers’ associations and trade unions from the West due to
the fact that most east German firms were yet to be privatised by the Treuhandanstalt
and lacked sufficient representation to raise the issue of competitiveness. Whether this
was done with the intention “to bind future east German firms and to effectively
prevent them from threatening their markets”
14 is difficult to prove, but three factors
have certainly contributed to this situation. First, the federal government’s initial
optimism on the time needed to complete the catching-up of eastern Germany
(“flourishing landscapes”); second, the objective of avoiding major out-migration
from eastern Germany that was presumed to take place if considerably lower wages
prevailed for a longer time; and third, equity considerations of the “same pay for the
same work”. These factors created an environment in which rapid wage convergence
was the easiest strategy to take. However, the five-year-agreements on full wage
convergence proved to be unfeasible and were basically abandoned in 1993, but high
rates of wage increases continued throughout the 1990s.
Unit labour costs by industries, calculated as the ratio of remuneration per employee
over gross value added per employed person relative to western Germany, show that
the biggest adjustments have taken place in traded goods sectors such as
manufacturing and financial and business services which have come down from
double in 1991 to almost western levels in 2000 (Table II.4). The agricultural sector
has had lower unit labour costs than the West since 1993 due to its relatively high
productivity. The construction sector has had a specific development in that its unit
labour costs were below western Germany’s level from 1994, but have been higher
since 1998 probably due to low labour productivity following over-capacities. Trade,
tourism and transport have basically always been 10 to 20% higher than the West.
TABLE II.4: Nominal unit labour costs* in different sectors in eastern Germany
(western Germany = 100), 1991-2000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
agriculture, forestry, fishery 147 108 73 84 84 93 89 81 81 79
industry (excl. construction) 161 151 120 122 121 109 105 103 101 98
- of which: manufacturing 205 174 136 135 133 124 115 111 107 104
construction 120 112 106 97 96 92 96 105 107 111
trade, tourism, transport 119 109 108 106 115 114 115 115 116 117
finance, housing, business services 209 163 127 117 119 116 113 112 111 106
public and other private services 104 105 106 104 107 107 107 110 112 110
total 143 128 116 113 116 113 112 113 114 113
* Remuneration per employee over GVA/employment ratio
Source: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”, own calculations.
14 Sinn/Westermann 2001, p.17.25
The situation in the services sector is more difficult to analyse since, on the one hand,
they include public services as well as services with administered prices which,
during the 1990s, tended to be lower than those in the West and resulted in lower
overall prices and productivity. On the other hand, many of these services are tradable
inputs to other products, thus casting doubts on the competitiveness of this most
dynamic sector of today’s economies. The wage level of the public sector – 90% of
the western level as of 2002 – is difficult to assess given that the concept of
productivity makes less sense in the absence of market prices so that factor costs have
to be taken as a substitute. However, the fact that the wage level in the public sector is
about 10% higher than the average is problematic for several reasons:
· It may take over the role of a benchmark or a leader in the wage bargaining
process in the private sector where wages in several sectors are higher than
productivity compared to the West;
· It makes employment in the public sector more attractive than in the private
sector, thus depriving the private sector of the more qualified people;
· Compared to the West, Länder and Gemeinden tend to be overstaffed as a left-
over from the large public sector of the GDR which leads to rather high personnel
expenditure. Apart from reducing staff, this leaves only a choice between lower
investment expenditure or higher indebtedness. In view of the urgent need for
better local infrastructure, many public entities have embarked on higher
indebtedness during the 1990s which has however reached its limits now.
15
While one may conclude that the situation had already improved considerably
towards the end of the 1990s, it should be recognised that a major share of adjustment
has taken place through the reduction of employment. In industry, which is the sector
that is most exposed to external competition, firms are forced to adjust immediately
by either closing down, or increasing their capital-intensity by higher investment
and/or reduction of employment, or leaving employers’ associations so as to allow for
wages below levels of branch-wide agreements between employers’ associations and
trade unions.
16 In this sector alone, half of employment - or 1 million jobs - have been
lost in net terms between 1991 and 2000. This employment effect cannot exclusively
be attributed to the closing down of old companies, but is also due to the failure to
attract new investment. Although 4% higher unit labour costs may be within the range
of statistical inaccuracy, a region attempting to catch up in terms of income,
productivity and employment should rather have lower unit labour costs than other
regions in order to compete for more investment and jobs.
15 See e.g. Von Hagen/Strauch 2000, pp.14ff.
16 In 1998, 46% of industry firms in eastern Germany had no tariff contracts, 19% firm-specific
contracts and 35% branch-wide tariff contracts (cf. IWH 1999 quoted in OECD Economic Surveys:
Germany; Paris 1999, p.81). According to IAB, 44% of west German firms were bound by branch-
wide tariff agreements in 1999, the figure for east German firms being 21%; in terms of employees, the
respective figures are 73% and 57% (cf. Sachverständigenrat 2000, p.193).26
2.4 Insufficient geographic labour mobility
In spite of higher unemployment and lower wages, people from eastern Germany
seem to migrate insufficiently – regarding a potentially equalising effect on
unemployment rates - to west German regions offering jobs and higher wages. The
main flows of out-migration from East to West took place in the years 1989 and 1990.
Since then, net migration from eastern Germany has been only slightly negative
although the improved development of the west German labour market in 1999 and
2000 suggests that out-migration has slightly increased again. In 1998 only 7,400
people left eastern Germany in net terms which are -0.05% relative to total population
(Table II.5). Sachsen-Anhalt and Sachsen were the Länder with the highest out-
migration, while Brandenburg is undergoing a specific development in that it benefits
from the long withheld urban expansion of Berlin – a common tendency of major
German cities over the last decades for people and firms to move to the outskirts.
There is some evidence that young and qualified people are leaving eastern Germany
more than other population groups,
17 although this is still hardly visible in the
demographic structure of eastern Germany relative to western Germany.
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TABLE II.5: Migration across Länder borders in 1000 persons, 1998
Brandenburg M.-Vorpommern Sachsen Sachsen-Anhalt Thüringen East Germany
to west Germany 23.3 21.8 39.3 27.6 24.1 136.1
east Germany 11.1 5.2 12.8 11.2 8.0 48.3
Berlin 19.4 3.4 3.6 2.7 1.3 30.4
from west Germany 14.3 16.5 26.1 16.6 16.3 89.8
east Germany 9.9 6.3 14.3 9.8 7.9 48.2
Berlin 47.9 2.5 2.6 1.7 1.1 55.8
net migration west Germany -9.0 -5.3 -13.2 -11.0 -7.8 -46.3
to (-)/from(+) east Germany -1.2 1.1 1.5 -1.4 -0.1 -0.1
Berlin 28.5 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -0.2 25.4
net migration from/to abroad 8.0 1.3 1.4 -0.3 3.2 13.6
net migration 26.3 -3.8 -11.3 -13.7 -4.9 -7.4
net migration in % of population 0.93 -0.21 -0.25 -0.51 -0.20 -0.05
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt; calculations by Hardt et al. 2001.
TABLE II.6: Change of residence across borders of different areas in % of population
inwards outwards inwards outwards
Gemeinden (1998) 5.3 5.3 6.0 5.9
Kreise (1998) 3.6 3.6 4.5 4.4
Länder (1999) 0.5 0.4 1.2 0.9
East Germany West Germany
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt; own calculations
Comparing geographic mobility in terms of a change of residence at different levels
of Länder, Kreise and Gemeinden between East and West in 1998/1999, mobility is
somewhat higher in western Germany, although not significantly: at the level of the
17 See Hardt/Kempe/Schneider 2001.
18 The only visible difference is for children under 6 whose share of total population in east Germany
was 3.6% and in western Germany 6.3% at the end of 1998.27
Gemeinden, it is about 6.0% in the West and 5.3% in the East relative to population
(Table II.6). The absence of significant East/West differences in mobility is
remarkable given the differences in labour market situations.
In general, the decision to migrate depends mainly on the expected difference in real
disposable income less the transaction (and social) costs of migration. Hence, people
migrate only if they expect an increase in purchasing power taking into account the
costs of moving, local prices, taxation, social transfers etc. The social security system,
while indispensable for those who cannot provide for their own income, takes away
much of the pressure on unemployed people to move to areas where they could find
employment. While certain elements have been reinforced in recent years to condition
unemployment benefits on the preparedness to move, these have been applied rather
reluctantly. Furthermore, the tax-benefit system in Germany often tends only
marginally – or sometimes not at all - to improve the income situation for those at the
lower end of the wage scale when changing from unemployment to employment.
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Source: Frick/ Lahmann 2000 (DIW socio-economic panel).
In addition to income equalisation mechanisms through a nation-wide system of fiscal
and social transfers, local prices for non-traded goods and services - housing prices in
particular - tend be much lower in poorer regions. One of the main constraints of
migration are the prices and transaction costs of housing which are a considerable
share of household expenditure. Therefore, the relative difference in real income is
usually much smaller than the difference in nominal income would suggest. Rents in
eastern Germany are on average about 10% lower than in western Germany (Graph
II.6). However, the difference depends largely on the year of construction. While
houses built in the 1990s have about the same rent, there is a difference of about 24%
for houses built in the 1980s, 15% for houses of the 1970s and 11% for houses built
between 1949 and 1971. The level of housing prices in eastern Germany is also due to
the tax breaks for investment in housing in the first half of the 1990s which have
contributed to over-capacities that put pressure on prices.28
3. Regional incidence of national policies
Following unification, fiscal policy in Germany had a pro-cyclical stance which
contributed to the weak economic growth in the 1990s and the building up of high
unemployment in Germany as a whole. This was also an outcome of major fiscal
transfers from West to East that were necessary to finance public investment and the
rather generous system of social security. Regulations in product, financial and labour
markets which eastern Germany adopted with unification were often too rigid to cope
with the need for fast adjustment.
3.1 Macroeconomic policies, interpersonal redistribution and fiscal transfers
Given the strong demand links, the economic situation of eastern Germany depends
largely on the situation in western Germany. Following German monetary, economic
and social union in July 1990 with the 1:1 conversion rate and the adoption of the
west German economic and social system, there was a major boost in demand. The
reaction was a rather unbalanced policy-mix with a pro-cyclical fiscal policy, which
increased the budget deficit by financing transfers to the East while trying to avoid
increases in taxation, plus a very tight monetary policy aimed at containing
inflationary pressures. The consequence was a major economic slowdown in 1992/93
with a negative growth rate of real GDP of –1.1% in 1993. The subsequent increase in
unemployment put fiscal policy under additional pressure to finance social
expenditure and the federal government embarked on higher taxes and expenditure
cuts. Growth rates remained rather modest until the end of the 1990s when the policy-
mix became more balanced with a lower budget deficit - based on both reductions in
taxes and expenditure supported by a more favourable business cycle in 2000 – and a
fairly neutral monetary policy conducted by the European Central Bank.
There is a major gap between production income and disposable income in eastern
Germany which is financed by transfers from the West. As can be seen in Table II.7,
west German (and EU) net transfers of about 4% of the west German GDP accounted
for roughly half of eastern Germany’s GDP in the early 1990s and about a third
towards the end of the 1990s. Of total gross transfers of about DM 180 billion per
year in the second half of the 1990s, DM 80 billion were social security benefits while
only about DM 30 billion were investment and about DM 15 million were subsidies.
19
While this imbalance has often been criticised, it was hardly to be avoided since it
was the consequence of fully adopting the west German institutional and legal
framework, including the welfare system.
19 Deutsche Bundesbank 199829
TABLE II.7: Public financial transfers to the new Länder in DM billion, 1991-1999
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(Plan)
Gross transfers to the new
Länder
Federal government budget
1) 75 88 114 114 135 138 131 134 145
German Unity Fund




5 9 12 17 19 18 19 18
Federal Labour Office




5 5 10 14 10 11 11 11 12
Total gross transfers
6) 135 146 162 164 178 180 176 183 191
Return flows
Additional tax revenue




T o t a l 3 33 73 94 34 54 74 74 75 0
Total intra-German net
transfers
102 109 123 120 133 133 129 136 141
in % of west German GDP
9) 3.7 3.8 4.2 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.1
European Union budget
8) 455677777
Total net transfers 106 114 128 126 140 140 136 143 148
in % of east German GDP
9) 52.3 43.8 40.2 34.2 35.6 34.2 32.6 33.6 34.1
1) As of 1995 also tax renouncements of the federal government on the basis of the reorganisation of
the fiscal equalisation scheme
2) Debt redemption, excluding the subsidies of federal government and the Länder
3) Net balance East excluding federal government transfers
4) Net balance East including federal government transfers to the Federal Labour Office
5) As of 1995 essentially revenues within the framework of the new fiscal equalisation scheme
6) Excluding double counting of federal government transfers to the Federal Labour Office (see
footnote 4)
7) Estimate; as of 1996 including the impact of the annual tax law
8) Estimate
9) Berlin included in west German GDP
Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen.
3.2 Functioning of labour, financial and product markets
Labour market regulation and the welfare system have been taken over from western
Germany in spite of the huge differences in economic situation. The west German
labour market system was mainly developed in the 1960s and 1970s when – at least
compared to present levels of unemployment – the German economy was operating
close to full employment. It was thus designed to protect employees rather than to
facilitate the hiring of the unemployed. Since then only minor modifications have
taken place to improve the situation so that the system was less than adequate for the
situation of the east German labour market of the 1990s. Particular problems at the
lower end of the wage scale arise from the tax-benefit system which reduces
incentives to create or take up jobs in that it introduces wage floors and sometimes
makes employment financially less attractive than remaining unemployed.30
In financial markets, a major problem for eastern Germany was the principle of
“restitution before compensation” of property which was laid down in the unification
treaty. According to this principle, state-owned property was to be returned to
previous owners rather than compensating them. This created major legal
uncertainties due to a lack of documentation and cases of several people claiming the
same property. As a consequence, the lack of clear property rights created
uncertainties for investment and financing through loans due to lack of collateral.
Many legal disputes, which usually take several years, had to be settled and continue
even more than a decade after unification. For these reasons, “greenfield” investment
was widespread in eastern Germany in the early 1990s while city centres and
traditional industrial sites were basically avoided by investors.
On product markets, one problem was the complete re-orientation of trade from
eastern to western Europe. After dissolving the COMECON and following the general
transformation problems, the traditional markets of eastern Germany had collapsed so
that new distribution networks in western Europe – including western Germany – had
to be built from scratch. In view of the lack of expertise in marketing, this was a
major problem for east German SMEs with potentially competitive products. Several
policy and private sector initiatives have been taken to promote the market access of
those east German firms that could not benefit from FDI-related networks.
4. Effects and efficiency of regional policies
The two main categories of regional policies in Germany are an explicit scheme of
fiscal equalisation (Finanzausgleich) and several pro-active programmes aimed at
promoting economic development. The Finanzausgleich between the German Länder
has been criticised for its exaggerated redistribution which creates disincentives for
the Länder to improve their economic and fiscal performance. In spite of a recent
reform of the system, it remains rather non-transparent and tends to dilute fiscal
responsibility. A wide range of regional policy programmes have been implemented
in eastern Germany and will continue over the coming years. For some measures,
there is a potential to improve their efficiency by a better targeting of expenditure.
4.1 Explicit fiscal transfers to regions
Since 1995, the new German Länder fully participate in the rather developed – and
therefore fairly complicated – explicit scheme of fiscal equalisation (Finanzausgleich)
between the different administrative levels of Bund (federal government), Länder
(states) and Gemeinden (municipalities) whose main principles are defined in Articles
106 and 107 of the Grundgesetz (federal constitution). Given that the sharing of
expenditure is only indirectly determined by the attribution of tasks to the different
levels, the system of fiscal equalisation works mainly through the sharing of tax
revenues. A “vertical” element allocates different taxes exclusively to Bund, Länder
and Gemeinden, while income taxes, corporate taxes, capital gains withdrawal taxes
and value added taxes are shared on the basis of certain objectives, in order “to
achieve a justified equalisation, to avoid an over-burdening of taxpayers and to
maintain the similarity of living conditions”. A “horizontal” element is introduced by31
a correction mechanism on the Länder share of the value added tax revenue which
aims to balance the differences in fiscal capacities and fiscal needs of the Länder.O n
the basis of a comparison between a “fiscal capacity index” and an “equalisation
index” for the average per capita fiscal capacity of all Länder (including half of the
tax revenues of Gemeinden), a redistribution of the value added tax revenue from
richer to poorer Länder is implemented in order to ensure that all Länder reach a
minimum fiscal capacity of 95% of the equalisation index. In addition, the poorer
Länder can receive supplementary allocations from the Bund (Bundesergänzungs-
zuweisungen) in order to improve further their fiscal position.
Through fiscal equalisation and supplementary federal allocations the western Länder
contribute about 0.1% of their GDP to improving the fiscal capacity of the eastern
Länder by about 5.1% (Table II.8). Contributing Länder are Hessen, Baden-
Württemberg, Bayern, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Hamburg whereas the main
beneficiaries in relative terms are Berlin, Bremen, Saarland and the eastern Länder.
For the east German Länder, the most important funds are the special supplementary
federal allocations of annual DM 14 billion in the context of the “Solidarity Pact”.
The relatively small contribution of Hamburg – given that it is the richest of all
Länder in terms of GDP per capita – and the large benefits of Berlin and Bremen are
due to certain bonus elements in the calculations given to the three “city Länder”a n d
to Länder with sea ports.
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Nordrhein-Westfalen 88,071 -2,201 0 85,870 -0.25
Bayern 62,219 -3,749 0 58,470 -0.54
Baden-Württemberg 54,453 -3,873 0 50,580 -0.67
Niedersachsen 33,793 1,113 1,890 36,796 0.87
Hessen 35,254 -5,354 0 29,900 -1.51
Rheinland-Pfalz 17,002 780 1,287 19,069 1.18
Schleswig-Holstein 11,932 358 791 13,081 0.93
Saarland 4,402 329 1,467 6,198 3.74
Hamburg 12,178 -1,099 0 11,079 -0.77
Bremen 2,990 872 1,930 5,792 6.49
Berlin 14,381 5,521 3,824 23,726 6.22
Total western Germany 336,675 -7,303 11,189 340,561 0.11
Sachsen 17,344 2,328 4,590 24,262 4.86
Sachsen-Anhalt 10,247 1,407 2,924 14,578 5.38
Thüringen 9,444 1,320 2,682 13,446 5.21
Brandenburg 10,163 1,263 2,690 14,116 4.89
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
6,879 983 2,015 9,877 5.40
Total eastern Germany 54,077 7,301 14,901 76,279 5.09
Total Germany 390,752 7,301 26,090 424,143 0.84
Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen and own calculations.32
The Federal Constitutional Court has judged several elements of the Finanzausgleich
to be unconstitutional and has requested a revision on the basis of general guidelines
to be decided by 2003 and implemented by 2005. This judgement was the outcome of
a complaint to the Constitutional Court by the governments of Hessen, Baden-
Württemberg and Bayern about the alleged excessive equalisation effects of the
Finanzausgleich which they claimed provided disincentives to both contributors and
beneficiaries to promote economic development through their often negative marginal
effects on net revenues. In June 2001, an agreement modifying certain elements of the
Finanzausgleich was reached between the federal government and the Länder
governments.
20 It was facilitated by the federal government’s commitment to take
over some public debt from the Länder and to finance a second “Solidarity Pact” for
eastern Germany from 2005 to 2019 totalling about € 156 billion. The latter will have
a decreasing path (from € 10.4 billion in 2005 to € 2.1 billion in 2019) of which € 51
billion is ring-fenced for business and infrastructure development while the remaining
€ 105 billion will be unconditional.
While this agreement slightly increases the incentives for the Länder to improve their
revenue situation and the east German Länder now have a long-term commitment on
which they can base their budgetary planning, this was also a missed occasion for a
more radical reform. The fiscal system is characterised by a fairly complicated
sharing of tax revenues and taxing powers between the different tiers of government
which has diluted the fiscal responsibilities of each of them. In this way, tax increases
can be more easily implemented if it is not clear to the citizen who is responsible and
if there is no tax competition between regions. Furthermore, any changes or reforms
become extremely difficult since they usually require double approval by both Bund
and Länder. This also explains the difficulty in establishing an internal stability pact
with sanctioning powers for compliance with the EU Stability Pact, something which
is still co-ordinated by an informal “budgetary planning council” in which the
different levels of government are represented.
4.2 Regional policy expenditures
There is a wide range of regional policy programmes specifically targeting eastern
Germany (Box II.2). A joint evaluation of these different policies is not available,
while there are many indicators, studies and evaluations of single programmes.
Regarding innovation and technology, most R&D indicators show that existing firms
and universities devote resources to R&D of between 75% and 100% of the level in
western Germany (Table II.9). However, given the weak economic structure in
eastern Germany, there is a major gap when indicators are related to total population.
20 Essentially a higher weight of 64% will be given to the fiscal capacity of the municipalities and the
progressivity of the “tax rate” of revenues over needs for net-contributing Länder will be flattened.33
TABLE II.9: Indicators on R&D in eastern and western Germany
East West West=100
R&D employees in % of all employed (1997) 3.49 4.24 82
R&D expenditure in % of total revenue (1997) 1.86 2.44 76
Patent registrations per 100,000 inhabitants (1995-98) 70 249 28
Private R&D expenditure in DM per inhabitant (1997) 215 792 27
Expenditure of universities in DM per inhabitant (1995-97) 1631 1724 95
Academic and artistic employed per 100,000 inhabitants (average 1995-98) 214 248 86
Source: DIW/IWH/IfW 2000, p.15; Pohl 2000, p.228.
BOXII.2: REGIONAL POLICY PROGRAMMES IN EASTERN GERMANY
The wide range of programmes specifically targeting eastern Germany can be summarised as follows:
21
· Several innovation and technology schemes, although most of them are also applied to west
German regions, are a particular focus of government programmes targeting the innovative
capacity of small and medium-sized firms in eastern Germany. These schemes concentrate on
directly strengthening corporate innovation, promoting co-operation between firms and with
universities and research centres, supporting regional innovative advisory centres and promoting
universities and technical colleges as well as expanding the scientific and research centres
· Economic development policy is composed of different elements. First, eastern Germany has been
eligible for EU Structural Funds assistance under Objective 1 since 1991. The Community Support
Framework for the period 2000-2006 was adopted in June 2000 and has a financial volume of EU
funds of € 20.7 billion which are co-financed by national public and private money. Second, the
Bund-Länder “Joint Task for Improving the Regional Economic Structure”, to which all new
Länder are eligible, gives assistance to private investment and local infrastructure related to private
investment. Maximum rates of assistance which vary according to sector, firm size and structural
problems of a region can reach 50% for investment grants and 80% for local infrastructure. Third,
a tax investment grant is given for initial investment at a rate of up to 12.5% for large firms and up
to 25% for SMEs, increased by 2.5 percentage points in border regions (INTERREG III regions).
Fourth, several specific SME schemes are channelled through state-owned banks (Deutsche
Ausgleichsbank and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau which have been merged recently) with
various financial instruments such as support to start-ups by equity capital, loans or guarantees.
· Infrastructure investment has been a main focus of public investment in eastern Germany. In the
transport sector, about 50% of the federal investment programme 1999-2002, which totals € 34.5
billion, is earmarked for railways, roads and waterways in eastern Germany. This is complemented
by an Operational Programme of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) on transport
infrastructure as a part of the Community Support Framework 2000-2006. In the context of the
Solidarity Pact, € 3.4 billion per year is foreseen for investment projects of the eastern Länder and
Gemeinden. Additional measures receiving public finance are on urban development and the
housing sector.
· Active labour market policy (ALMP) measures are being undertaken by both national and EU
programmes on training, public work provision, wage subsidies, financing of reduced working
time and early retirement. ALMP in eastern Germany had a financial volume of about € 11 billion
in the years 1999 and 2000 respectively. Most measures target problem groups such as long-term,
older and younger unemployed people. On annual average in 2000, there were about 233,000
participants in training schemes, 192,000 in job creation schemes, 120,000 in jobs with subsidised
labour costs, 90,000 in early retirement schemes, 35,000 in youth unemployment and 48,000 in
other schemes, totalling 717,000 participants.34
The impact of the EU Structural Funds programmes in eastern Germany since 1994
has been simulated by a sectoral macroeconometric model (“HERMIN”).
22 In spite of
the limited size of Structural Funds (and national public co-financing) which was
initially about 2 percent of GDP and will decline gradually to around 1.2 percent in
the year 2006, the combined demand-side and supply-side effects have increased from
3% in 1994 to above 4% in the period 2000-2006 (Graph II.7). After 2006, when the
simulation assume that Structural Funds payments stop, the effects level off to supply-
side effects of about 1.5% in 2010. Similarly, the unemployment rate is more than 2
percentage points lower than it would be without the Structural Funds programmes
throughout most of the period 1994 to 2006. However, after 2006 the effect on
unemployment diminishes due to the assumption that the continuing supply-side
effects mainly have an effect on productivity rather than on employment.
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Source: Bradley/Morgenroth/Untiedt 2000, p.11.
In the context of the Joint Task for Improving the Regional Economic Structure to
which all new Länder are eligible, DM 17 billion was spent between 1996 and 1998
on promoting private investment of a volume of DM 58 billion which aimed to create
108,000 new jobs and to secure 300,000 existing jobs; DM 6 billion was spent on
local infrastructure projects.
23 The Joint Task foresees a regional differentiation of
maximum rates of assistance to private investment with a bias against better-
performing regions, i.e. rates of assistance to private investment are lower in those
areas with higher growth.
24 The official rationale is that other instruments such as
R&D or urban policy measures will strengthen these growth poles anyway.
21 Cf. Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2001, pp.53ff.
22 Bradley/Morgenroth/Untiedt 2000
23 Cf. Bundesregierung 1999; job estimates based on approved applications.
24 The so-called “A-areas of assistance” have maximum rates of 50% for SMEs and 35% for other
firms whereas the so-called ”B-areas of assistance” have rates of 43% and 28% respectively, the latter35
The volume of subsidies peaked in 1996 and has decreased since then (Graph II.8).
While the volume of state aid has remained fairly stable, the decline is mostly due to a
special depreciation scheme for investment in the new Länder, which came to an end
in 1998, as well as to the abolition of the wealth tax and the business capital tax in the
West that had never been introduced in the East so that they are no longer considered
to be tax breaks. Per DM 1000 of GDP, there were DM 182 of subsidies in 1991 and
DM 97 in 1999 in eastern Germany, while the value was rather stable at about DM 30
in western Germany.
25
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 2000 (based on data from Federal Ministry of Finance).
The number of start-ups and liquidations in eastern Germany can be seen as a further
indicator of the success of these various measures (Graph II.9). The number of start-
ups halved from 1991 to 1994 and increased again until 1998.
26 However, at the same
time the number of liquidations increased steadily, leading to a decline in the positive
net balance to only 9,000 in 1998. Nevertheless, adding up the total balance from
1991-1998, a net 328,000 enterprises have been created and have survived.
being, as of 1 January 2000, the labour-market regions of Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig, Jena, Schwerin,
Halle/Saale, Chemnitz, Magdeburg, Eisenach, Sonneberg, Grimma and Belzig as well as parts of the
labour-market regions of Erfurt, Weimar, Pirna, Zwickau, Bautzen and Gotha.
25 Cf. Pohl 2000, p.233 based on data from Federal Ministry of Finance.
26 Actual market entries, estimated on the basis of commercial business registrations, applications for
the Federal financial support programme ERP and on empirical inquiries. It must be taken into account
though, that the high number of start-ups in east Germany in the early 1990s was partially the outcome
of the restructuring and privatisation of GDR socialist firms (“Kombinate”) with a very high vertical
integration and social policy functions.36
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A further indicator of the success of policies in eastern Germany is the volume of
private investment which, in order to converge towards the west German economy,
needs to be higher for a considerable period of time. In per capita terms, gross fixed
capital formation in constant prices has indeed been higher than in western Germany
since 1993, by more than 50% in 1995 but declining to 24% in 1998 (Graph II.10).
The capital stock per capita is estimated to have reached a level of 72.5% of the west
German level. However, it must be taken into account that the figures also include
public investment which accounts for a considerable share of total investment in
eastern Germany. In most years, about two thirds of fixed investment has been in
buildings while only one third went into equipment. This is a problem with regard to
private housing where over-capacities have built up so that an estimated 1 million
apartments are now deserted - most of them standard GDR houses – leading to calls
for more public funding to tear down deserted buildings.
Regarding the public capital stock, a study by two economic research institutes (DIW
and RWI) estimated that in 2005 – in spite of major achievements in adding,
modernising and upgrading infrastructure over the last decade - eastern Germany will
still have a deficit in infrastructure relative to western Germany of a value of between
DM 265 and 275 billion.
27 A new calculation by DIW arrives at a lower value of DM
157 billion.
28 Graph II.11 illustrates that the public capital stock per inhabitant is
already higher than in the West in several public functions, in particular in social
institutions, while there are major deficits in waste water treatment, roads, universities
and schools.
27 DIW/IWH/IfW 2000, p.24, based on DIW/ifo/RWI/ILS: Solidarpakt II – Infrastrukturelle
Nachholbedarfe Ostdeutschlands, March 2000, unpublished.
28 Cf. Vesper 200137
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Source: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder”.
GRAPH II.11: Public gross fixed capital stock of east German Länder and Gemeinden





























A review of existing evaluation studies on the impact of active labour market policies
(ALMP) in eastern Germany arrives at the following main conclusions regarding the
two main types of programmes:
29
· Regarding measures on further training, some studies show positive results which
are however not consistent over different specifications regarding time and target
groups. Most microeconomic studies find no significant impact of further training
29 Fitzenberger/Speckesser 200038
although macroeconomic analyses on Germany as a whole find a reduction of
regional long-term unemployment.
· For work provision schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, “ABM”), only one
study arrives at positive effects while three other studies find significantly
negative effects. Macroeconomic analyses of Germany as a whole find a positive
impact of ABM.
Given the available data and the methodological heterogeneity of the studies, the
authors conclude that the impact of training measures and ABM is at best low,
although not necessarily negligible. Two studies recently carried out for the Federal
Ministry of Finance criticise the consistently negative effects of ABM in reducing the
incentives to look for a regular job for two reasons.
30 First, the wage is paid at 20%
less than those in collective agreements and is therefore often higher than for many
regular jobs paid outside collective agreements. Second, participation in ABM renews
the right to unemployment benefits that are higher than unemployment assistance to
which long-term unemployed are entitled; this has already been abolished for training
measures in 1998. The overall conclusion is that ALMP need to be better targeted to
specific problem groups and the requirements of the labour market, but should not
serve merely as a means of reducing unemployment temporarily by creating a second
labour market.
5. Conclusions and policy options
A global analysis of the main determinants of unemployment in eastern Germany
identified in section 2 and of the national and regional policies described in sections 3
and 4, allows a number of policy conclusions to be developed.
The employment situation in eastern Germany depends strongly on the overall
economic situation in eastern Germany and in Germany as a whole. As has been
evidenced by the negative experience in Germany in the first half of the 1990s, a
balanced macroeconomic policy-mix, based on the objective of a budget in balance or
in surplus in the medium term is an important condition for long-term growth and
employment. Structural reforms on labour markets are necessary to facilitate the
adjustment and creation of employment in Germany, and should also continue on
product and financial markets. Transfers to eastern Germany through the social
security system and the Finanzausgleich will remain necessary for a longer time until
there is a sufficient degree of convergence in the tax base. However, the fact that most
of these transfers are for consumption rather than for public investment is a
continuing problem which makes catching-up a longer process than necessary.
Regarding the Finanzausgleich, the main objective to reduce disincentives is
somewhat under-ambitious in that it would also be an occasion to introduce more
fiscal responsibility by a clearer sharing of taxing powers between Bund, Länder and
Gemeinden so that citizens would know who is responsible for changes in taxation.
This would also allow the introduction of some degree of tax competition at different
30 Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung 2000 and Schneider et al. 200039
regional levels. The remaining deficits in infrastructure and technology will require
continuing efforts in public investment. However, support to infrastructure and private
investment has the potential to be improved in terms of efficiency by a stronger focus
on growth poles rather than pursuing the present implicit objective of an equal
economic development across eastern Germany by giving higher rates of assistance to
the least developed areas. At the very least, there should be no differentiation in rates
of assistance to private investors within eastern Germany who would prefer the
advantages of locating in the emerging clusters that have to compete with other
attractive locations in Europe.
To upgrade the qualification of the labour force, a review of active labour market
policies (ALMP) should provide for a better targeting instead of creating a second
labour market which reduces unemployment only temporarily. Incentives for
participation in ALMP should be reviewed in order to promote the search for regular
jobs rather than the return into the benefit system. Institutions of education, training
and public R&D need to have sufficient resources to be able to achieve the same
standards as in western Germany.
In order to address the problem of overly high unit labour costs in eastern Germany,
more wage differentiation taking account of the specific conditions of sectors, regions
and firms is most important. Actual increases in productivity in firms in eastern
Germany rather than west German wage levels should be the benchmark, given that
west German wages are themselves an average of high-productivity and low-
productivity regions. Wage negotiations should also take account of the fact that – in
the presence of regional price differences – equal nominal wages imply higher real
wages for people in areas with lower price levels such as many areas in eastern
Germany. Wage convergence in the public sector should only follow the private
sector and should not lead in negotiations. However, in view of the increases in east
German public sector wages agreed until 2002 (leading to a level of 90% of nominal
wages in the West and thereby basically equal real wages for many regions with low
costs of living) a high degree of wage moderation should prevail in this sector in the
years after 2002 in order to get closer again to the overall wage level in eastern
Germany.
Various factors should be addressed to remove barriers to geographic labour mobility
and to increase the propensity to move. First, the system of unemployment benefits
and assistance should provide more incentives to look for and take up jobs elsewhere
rather than only forcing unemployed people to accept jobs in commuting distance to
their place of residence. Second, the flexibility of the housing market should be
enhanced by reducing transaction costs for purchasing and renting houses. Third, the
possibility of introducing regional correction coefficients for social transfers and
public sector wages in Germany should be evaluated as an option to bring about more
equality in real income rather than in nominal income (see the example of the
European Communities in Annex I). A revival of the earlier regional differentiation of
public sector wages by the Ortszuschlag (local allowance) could be a starting point
for this option.40
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III. THE SPANISH OBJECTIVE 1 REGIONS
1. Introduction
Since the mid-1990s the unemployment situation in Spain has improved considerably
as a consequence of high rates of employment growth. From its peak in 1994 at
24.4%, the unemployment rate has decreased by 10 percentage points to 14.4% in
2000. Nevertheless, regional disparities in unemployment have hardly diminished and
the unemployment situation of the Spanish regions, the Comunidades Autónomas,
31
still varies considerably (Graph III.1). Comparing the situation in the years 1994 and
2000, the unemployment rate was reduced by more than 10 percentage points in the
northern and eastern regions, whereas the reduction was mostly by less than 10
percentage points in the 11 poorer (Objective 1) regions of Spain.
32 At provincial
level, the unemployment rates varied from 4.7% in Lérida/Cataluña to 30.2% in
Cadiz/Andalucía. As an expression of labour shortages in specific sectors, in
particular agriculture and construction, some regions recently asked for an increase in
the number of work permits allocated to foreigners (e.g. Galicia and Murcia).





























Source: Eurostat – Community Labour Force Survey.
31 In Eurostat’s statistical classification of regions, these are NUTS level 2 while provinces are NUTS
level 3.
32 Objective 1 regions are Galicia, (Principado de) Asturias, Castilla y Léon, Castilla-La Mancha,
Extremadura, (Comunidad) Valencia(na), Andalucía, (Region de) Murcia, Ceuta y Melilla and
Canarias. Cantabria is a specific case in that it receives transitional support under Objective 1 until the
end of 2006.43
The source of the above figures is a labour force survey whose harmonised
Community methodology is co-ordinated by Eurostat and is based on the ILO
definition of unemployment (i.e. not having worked a certain number of hours per
week, actively looking for a job and prepared to take up a job). An alternative
methodology, the rates of registered unemployment, gives results which are lower in
level, but regional differences are still high.
33 The rates of registered unemployment
rates for Andalucía and Extremadura show the biggest deviation from the labour force
survey which is due to the fact that unemployed agricultural workers who are in a
region-specific social security scheme are not taken into account in statistics of
registered unemployment.
This paper proceeds by first looking at some stylised facts that help in understanding
regional unemployment in Spain, then gives an overview of national and regional
policies and, finally, draws some policy conclusions.
2. Determinants of regional unemployment: some stylised facts
Faced with different economic shocks in the 1980s and 1990s, Spanish regions and
their labour markets reacted differently in adjusting to the new situation. Among the
various possible mechanisms of adjustment – growth and structural change, sectoral
mobility, wages and geographic mobility – some regions had a response which led
more strongly towards unemployment increases than in other regions. The failure of
adjustment mechanisms in avoiding the emergence and persistence of regional
disparities in unemployment will be further explained in this section.
2.1 The economic development of the Spanish Objective 1 regions
Regional unemployment in Spain is strongly linked to the economic development of
the regions. Graph III.2 demonstrates that there is a high negative correlation (of -
0.78) between GDP per head and unemployment rates. This paper thus has a
particular focus on those Spanish regions that are eligible for EU Structural Funds
assistance under Objective 1 in the programming period 2000-2006. Particular
attention is given to Andalucía and Extremadura which are the regions with the
highest unemployment rates of about 25% and also the poorest Spanish regions.
34
These two regions also stand out for having a significantly high share of employment
in agriculture (10%) and a low share in industry (25%) compared to the national
average (4% and 32% respectively). In these and other poorer regions the share of
agricultural employment in total employment used to be a third or even more two
decades ago which implies a major process of adjustment.
33 In April 2000, Asturias (14.7%), Ceuta y Melilla (13.5%), Canarias (12.8%), Extremadura (12.7%),
Andalucía (12.4%) and Galicia (12.2%) had more than double the rate of registered unemployment of
Cataluña (6.1%) as the lowest.
34 Almost the same holds for Ceuta and Melilla which are however not a Comunidad Autonoma,a r e
more difficult to analyse because of problems of data availability and have a specific location in Africa.44
GRAPH III.2: GDP per head in 1998 (PPS, EU15=100) and unemployment rate in April
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Source: Eurostat.
In a long-run perspective across all Spanish regions, there was a strong process of
convergence of GDP per capita from the 1950s until 1984. Capital/labour ratios have
converged across the 17 Spanish regions since the 1970s due to both labour-shedding
and higher private investment in regions with a relatively low stock of private capital.
However, returns to private physical capital have not been significantly higher in
high-unemployment regions and have thus not helped reduce differences in
unemployment rates among regions.
35 Between 1985 and 2000, the catching-up at
national level of 10 percentage points to 81% of the EU average in purchasing power
standards (PPS) was accompanied by a moderate process of divergence at both
regional and provincial level which is rather robust for different data sources and
measures of convergence.
36 However, in the same period there is little change in the
interregional distribution of disposable household income per capita. The main
explanation for this development is that, although labour productivity continued to
converge, net employment creation was lower in poorer regions i.a. due to labour-
shedding in agriculture which was not compensated by other new jobs.
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2.2 The qualification of the labour force
Although Spain’s expenditure on education has already been comparable to the EU
average for many years, it takes a long time in catching-up countries to build an
educational level of its population which is comparable to other Member States. In
Spain, some 65% of the population aged 25 to 59 has no educational levels beyond
35 Cf. Mauro/Spilimbergo 2001.
36 Cf. Salas 1999.
37 Cf. De la Fuente 2001c.45
compulsory schooling. People in this age group with higher education are more
concentrated in the northern regions and Madrid. Given this spatial pattern of
educational skills and the general fact that education levels and unemployment tend to
be negatively correlated contribute to a corresponding spatial pattern of
unemployment. Therefore, the persistence of unemployment over time is higher in
regions where the qualification of the workforce is low. Comparing unemployment
rates in the 50 provinces in 1977 and 1992, Mauro/Spilimbergo (1998) find a higher
correlation between unemployment rates in the two years in provinces where skills are
lower. In a comparison between the Portuguese and Spanish labour markets,
Bover/García-Perea/Portugal (2000) find that – in spite of the overall higher
educational endowments - returns to education are much lower in Spain. They explain
this partly in terms of a higher supply of educated labour, but also in terms of more
compressed wages across skill groups. Incentives to higher education in the form of
justified expectations for higher wages are thus lower in Spain than in Portugal.
2.3 Wages out of line with productivity
Although the Spanish wage bargaining system is formally decentralised, the actual
outcome is rather similar across regions. The wage bargaining system has several
spatial dimensions: national, regional, provincial, and firms. It takes place according
to a cascading system in which the outcome of agreements for a sector at national
level is de facto accepted as a minimum at regional level. This system was amended
by the 1994 labour market reform and an agreement with the social partners in April
1997 stipulates that negotiations on wages can take place at the firm level. However,
the option for a firm to opt out of provincial wage agreements, as foreseen by the
1994 reform in certain cases, has only rarely been applied since the conditions are
very restrictive and it tends to be seen as a signal for financial troubles of the
companies concerned. In 2000, 46% of all firms had firm-specific agreements, but
this affected only 11% of all employees covered by wage agreements (Table III.1).
Overall, the multiple levels of the system introduce an inflationary tendency by
successively adding on to agreements reached at the higher level. Furthermore, many
wage agreements include catch-up clauses in case inflation turns out to be higher than
assumed at the time of the agreement, and this may endanger Spain’s external
competitiveness given that inflation tends to be higher than the euro area average.
TABLE III.1: Wage agreements at firm level and other level in % of total, 1998-2000
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
firm level 72.5 72.5 72.4 11.7 11.8 11.0 47.1 46.0 46.4
other level 27.5 27.5 27.6 88.3 88.2 89.0 52.9 54.0 53.6
total (n°) 5,091 5,110 4,583 8,750,600 9,008,100 8,643,000 2,028,700 2,073,800 2,059,800
agreements employees firms
Source: Spanish Ministry of Labour (http://www.mtas.es/).
Calculations of real unit labour costs in the Spanish regions for the first half of the
1990s suggest that differences in real wages between high-unemployment and low-
unemployment regions in Spain were not sufficiently large to offset differences in46
productivity, resulting in unit labour costs being 5% higher in regions of high
unemployment than in those with low unemployment.
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Calculations based on more recent data from the new ESA95 methodology of
economic accounts give a rather mixed picture across sectors. Real unit labour costs
in manufacturing – calculated for the year 1998 as the ratio of compensation per
employee and of GVA per employed person, adjusted for regional inflation
differentials since 1992 – varied by about 10 percentage points around the national
average with no clear correlation with regional unemployment (Graph III.3). For
example, in Extremadura productivity and wages were both at about two thirds of the
national average while in Pais Vasco wages and productivity were both more than
20% above national average. The average unit labour costs of the manufacturing
sector in Objective 1 regions taken together was almost the same as the national
average. The overall picture of rather similar unit labour costs within a certain range
of methodological uncertainty is not very surprising in the manufacturing sector
which is most exposed to interregional and international competition so that different
adjustment mechanisms will always exert a tendency to bring wages in line with
productivity relative to other competitors, mainly through variations in employment.
Wages below productivity make a region attractive for investment and increase
employment while wages above productivity forces employers to reduce employment
and in this way to increase productivity. High-unemployment regions should thus
have below average unit labour costs and lower wage increases than average in order
to increase employment.
In other sectors for which data to calculate real unit labour costs are available, the
results can be summarised as follows (see detailed results in the table in Annex III):
· In agriculture and fishing as well as mining and quarrying, the results make little
sense and are probably biased by the large amounts of subsidies paid in these
sectors which have a strong influence on the relationship between wages and gross
value added;
· In the industry sector, construction is rather similar to manufacturing whereas
electricity, gas and water sectors vary considerably across regions, probably
because liberalisation in this sector was not yet very advanced in 1998;
· In market services, there is a tendency for unit labour costs to be low in the
Objective 1 regions and high in the more prosperous regions;
· In non-traded services, there is little deviation from the national average which is
probably due to the statistical need to take factor costs (most of which are wages)
as a proxy for value added.
Regional wage dispersion, here measured by the coefficient of variation of
compensation per employee, may point to regional problems in some sectors (Graph
III.4). The coefficient tends to be rather low for construction, transport and
communications, financial services, business activities, education, social work and
household services. As a consequence, jobs in these sectors, for example in health and
38 Cf. Mauro/Prasad/Spilimbergo 1999.47
education, are relatively attractive in the poorer regions since compensation is high
compared to the average wage within a region, but relatively unattractive in the
wealthier regions. It is interesting to note, however, that there is a rather high
variation of compensation in the public administration, reaching ECU 31,000 in Pais
Vasco and only ECU 15,800 in Extremadura; the more autonomous regions obviously
make use of their powers to pay higher salaries to their staff.
39





































Note: Unit labour costs as compensation per employee over GVA/employment ratio deflated by the
regional consumer price index relative to national consumer price index (basis 1992). Results for Ceuta
y Melilla were excluded because they were implausibly low, possibly due to small sample size effects.
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
39 However, given that the number of employees are not on the basis of full time equivalents they are
sensitive to differences in working time. For example, the introduction of the 35-hour week for civil
servants in Andalucía, Extremadura, La Rioja and Navarra in 2000 will further increase these
differences if this measure actually contributes to increases in staff numbers in these regions’ public
administrations.48
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2.4 Insufficient geographic labour mobility
In spite of high unemployment, geographic labour mobility in Spain is among the
lowest in the EU. In 1999, only 0.1% of all employed between 15 and 64 years had
changed residence compared to one year earlier which compares to an EU average of
1.4%.
40 Similarly low rates are recorded for commuting. Over time, interregional
mobility (i.e. between Comunidades) relative to total population has declined from
0.9% in 1964 to a low of 0.3% in 1982 and stabilised between 0.5% and 0.6% in the
1990s.
41 However, intraregional and intraprovincial mobility has increased steadily
from about 0.5% to about 1.5%. Interregional mobility in Spain is very low compared
to 1% to 2.5% in other major EU countries and 3% in the US.
42
Several reasons are usually given for this particularly low degree of mobility in Spain:
40 Cf. European Commission 2001b, p.51.
41 Cf. Bentolila 2001, p.3.
42 Cf. Bentolila 2001, p.5.49
· High aggregate unemployment which prevailed in the 1990s reduces incentives to
move since it is difficult to find a new job elsewhere;
· 90 per cent of new job contracts are of a temporary nature so that now about one
third of all jobs are based on temporary contracts. This type of contract provides
little security for the costs incurred by moving;
· the strong centralisation of wage bargaining, which does not take sufficient
account of regional differences in productivity and costs of living, thus limiting
incentives in terms of real wage differences to move from less prosperous to more
prosperous regions (see also section III.2.3 on regional wage dispersion);
· unemployment benefits and high severance payments that are largely tax-exempt
offer a sufficient financial basis to prefer a position of unemployment for a longer
time to the alternative of moving to where a job is available;
· family networks, which offer support for each family member and the respective
obligations for each of them, are still of high importance;
43
· persistent rigidities in the housing market for various reasons make moving an
expensive exercise (see section III.3.2 for further details).
3. Regional incidence of national policies
Given the high degree of decentralisation in Spain, macroeconomic policies,
redistributive policies and structural policies decided by the central government have
varying effects on the Spanish regions. Fiscal decentralisation has devolved many
tasks to the regional governments which requires, on the other hand, strong efforts of
co-ordination at the central level in order to maintain a coherent policy.
3.1 Macroeconomic policies
The Spanish general government budget has seen a rapid process of consolidation
over the last decade. While revenues relative to GDP have remained stable at
somewhat below 40% in the 1990s, expenditure has been reduced from a peak of
47.6% in 1993 to 40% in 2000, thus bringing down the public deficit by more than 6
percentage points. The 2001 budget is planned to be balanced and the updated
Stability Programme of early 2001 foresees a surplus of 0.2-0.3% in the coming years.
During this process of consolidation, public investment has been maintained above
3% and is programmed to increase to 3.8% in 2004 which is far above the EU average
of 2.2% to 2.4% registered in the last years.
In 2000, according to provisional figures, general government had a deficit of –0.3%
of GDP. The central government had a deficit of –0.5% of GDP which was equalised
43 Cf. Bentolila 2001, p.10.50
by a corresponding surplus of social security. In the same year, the regions taken
together had a deficit of about –0.3% of GDP with little variation between them. The
regions’ total debt relative to GDP was highest in Valencia (10.1%), Galicia (9.1%),
Andalucía (8.5%), Cataluña (8.3%), Navarra (6.3%) and Extremadura (5.8%); all
other regions had a total debt of below 5% of GDP. Although their total debt
amounted to only 6.3% of GDP - which compares to a general government’s debt of
61.1% in 2000 – this is rather high in view of their relatively small budgets and the
debt servicing this implies.
In conjunction with the 2001 budget, the Spanish government has presented a draft
“General Law on Budgetary Stability” which commits the public sector, including all
three levels of government and social security, to a budget in balance or in surplus
from 2003. Deficits shall only be allowed in duly justified exceptional situations and
require a medium term economic-financial plan for reducing the deficit in the three
subsequent years. In order to achieve these targets, the central government defines
stability objectives for each level of government. These would have to be translated
into stability objectives of each of the regions by the Council for fiscal and financial
policies (CPFF). The government’s main instrument for controling compliance with
these rules is the requirement that the regions’ debt emissions must have prior
authorisation by the central government. However, depending on the definition of
exceptional situations, there may be an overly high inflexibility of fiscal policy in
dealing with asymmetric shocks, in particular for regional and local governments
which have a relatively non-diversified, and therefore unstable, tax base.
3.2 Interpersonal redistribution and fiscal transfers
The various categories of a budget’s revenue and expenditure sides have different
effects on income distribution. A decomposition of the redistributive effects on
household income across Spanish regions shows that in 1995 the strongest effect
came from social benefits (77%) followed by direct income taxes (33%) whereas
social security contributions had a slightly regressive effect (-7%), probably arising
from the maximum and minimum thresholds built into the system.
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De la Fuente (2001a) classified all public expenditure in Spain between 1990 and
1997 into four major categories: administration, regional expenditure, social security
and economic development policy. On the basis of fiscal flows (including both
revenues and expenditure) between regions in per capita values as annual averages, he
finds the following results:
· only 27% of fiscal flows are actually regional, while 65% are based on personal
redistribution;
· the redistributive effect of the budget (of about 33% on the per capita income of
regions) relative to the national average relies almost exclusively on the revenue
side while the expenditure side has a slight regressive effect. Within the broad
44 Cf. Salas 1999.51
categories, some 90% of the redistributive effect arises from personal
redistribution;
· the situation of per capita resources between different regions varies considerably
and seems to be based on rather arbitrary criteria which put into danger the rights
of equal access to public services.
De la Fuente (2001b) identifies three main weaknesses of the Spanish system in the
period 1997-2001: the inequality and arbitrariness of the financing of regional
budgets, the lack of autonomy and the absence of fiscal responsibility of the regional
administration. Most of these problems have their origin in the asymmetric
decentralisation which is rather advanced on the expenditure side and almost non-
existent on the revenue side. In light of the constitutional principles of equality and
solidarity, he concludes that the discussion should be more focused on individuals
than on regions, i.e. on personal rather than on regional income distribution. His
proposal for a new system is, first, to establish a basic level of finance per capita
which is the same for all regions so that additional resources would have to arise from
higher regional taxation; second, to determine the level of revenues of the sub-central
level from both central budget transfers and shares of personal income tax, VAT and
special taxes; and, finally, to give the regions the legislative power to modify the rates
of the shared taxes.
The tax-benefit-system as a whole is not particularly generous compared to the rest of
the EU. Although labour income taxes account for some 60% of general government
revenue, the tax wedge is approximately at the OECD average and below the EU
average. While the statutory minimum wage is rather low, the unemployment benefits
system is considered rather generous by international comparisons. The net
replacement rate for low-wage earners is the same as the EU average (70%), but
somewhat higher for low-income families. Unemployment benefits amount to 70% of
the previous wage for the first 6 months and 60% thereafter, with floors and ceilings
related to the minimum wage. The duration of unemployment benefits depends on the
last job’s tenure up to a maximum of two years after which unemployment assistance
of 75% of the statutory minimum for maximum 30 months is paid. The Spanish
labour market is characterised by high employment protection, in particular in the
form of high severance payments for workers on permanent contracts which
contribute to high labour costs. Severance payments can be considered as a part of the
benefit system since they come on top of unemployment benefits and are not taxable.
As a consequence, a large share of jobs created in Spain in the 1990s have been on
fixed-term contracts and in this way has introduced more flexibility at least in one part
of the labour market. Despite the successive reduction of the severance payments in
different reforms in 1997, 1999 and 2001, a major share of new jobs is still based on
fixed-term contracts.
3.3 Functioning of markets
The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) for the year 2001 recognise that
Spain has taken several measures to improve the functioning of its product markets,
the knowledge-based economy and capital markets. The transposition of internal
market legislation and the liberalisation of the telecommunications and energy52
markets has been speeded up; the Community rules on public procurement have been
implemented more effectively and the level of State aid has been reduced. To tackle
the problem of the low level of R&D expenditure, a three-year National R&D and
Innovation Plan has been launched.
A specific problem with strong adverse effects on the functioning of labour markets,
is an inflexible housing market. First, there is an underdeveloped market for rental
housing which is reflected in one of the highest shares of owner-occupied housing in
the OECD at about 80%. This is a consequence of the minimum length of renting
contracts of five years and generous tax preferences for owner-occupied housing. Tax
preferences are granted to owner-occupied housing in the personal income tax
projected to equal to 9.1% of personal income tax revenues in the 2000 State Budget.
Second, house prices are relatively high by international standards and prices vary
significantly from one region to another because of restricted urban land supply.
Local governments, which control most of the supply of urban land, have an interest
in keeping prices high as land sales and real estate taxes constitute an important share
of municipal tax revenues. As a rationing strategy, municipalities often take a long
time to provide licenses to use land for construction and can ask that 10 percent of the
land be used for urban development purposes. In 1997, 42% of their current revenues
(excluding transfers from other levels of government; 22% of total revenues)
originated from taxes on land and real estate. Taxes and other fees contribute to rather
high transaction costs of about 10% of house prices. The government decided in June
2000 that municipalities have to provide objective reasons when denying land
development plans and that development can start if no explicit objection is received
within six months.
With a view to labour markets, the government adopted - at the end of 1999 and again
in March 2001 - programmes to reduce employers’ social security payments and
severance payments for new permanent contracts, whether full- or part-time, for
groups with greater difficulties in entering the labour market (women, long-term
unemployed, older people, agricultural worker, socially excluded).
45 Moreover,
severance payments for temporary contracts have recently been introduced in order to
increase the relative attractiveness of permanent contracts since about a third of all
employees are working on the basis of a temporary contract. The OECD suspects that
this reform has contributed to a shift from underground employment into the formal
labour market since employment growth was strongest in construction and the
services sector where the underground economy is most prevalent.
46 The government
intended to introduce further measures of labour market reform towards the end of
2001 along with the Budget law. Depending on the progress in the social dialogue,
these measures could include reforms of social protection and collective bargaining as
well as regulations aimed to reducing accidents at work.
45 Cf. Kingdom of Spain 2001, and OECD 2001. Firing costs are 20 days of wages per year of work for
permanent contracts for these special groups (33 for other groups) in the case of justified dismissals (33
and 45 if unjustified, which courts tend to see as the rule). In all cases, it is 8 days for temporary
contracts.
46 OECD 2000, p.30.53
Comparing the very different performance of the Portuguese and the Spanish labour
markets, Bover/García-Peres/Portugal (2000) conclude that the institutional
differences in the wage-setting mechanisms are the main explanation for these
differences. In spite of a low union density of only 11%, Spanish trade unions are
more powerful in setting high wage floors because of high severance payments, state
funding and the statutory extension clause. This results in a compressed wage
distribution within and across skill categories which – in view of skill-biased
technological change – prices many low-productivity jobs out of the market. They
recommend broadening the effective base of workers represented in the unions,
emphasising bargaining at firm level by more operational opt-out clauses, eliminating
the statutory extension clause and reducing dismissal costs.
4. Effects and efficiency of regional policies
Since the recognition of the regions in the constitution in 1978, a continuing process
of fiscal decentralisation has given Spanish regions considerable margins of
manoeuvre to conduct their own regional policies. Further steps for the future system
were agreed in July 2001. However, concerns are expressed that this process should
not go too far since this might endanger unity and solidarity within Spain as stipulated
in the constitution. Furthermore, the asymmetry of strong decentralisation of
expenditure which is not matched by a parallel process on revenues is criticised for
exerting inappropriate incentives on the regional governments’ budgetary behaviour.
4.1 Explicit fiscal transfers to regions
Over the last 25 years, fiscal decentralisation has advanced substantially. The central
government’s share in total public expenditure declined from almost one half in 1980
to less than a third in 1998, a level which is comparable to federal countries like
Germany and the US (Graph III.5). At the same time, the regional governments’ share
in public expenditure has increased from almost nil to more than 20%. The central
government has remained the most important level in terms of expenditure in defence,
public order and safety while the regional governments have become most important
in education and health care (Table III.2).54
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Source: Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda - Cuentas de las Administraciones Publicas, here taken
from Vinuela 2000.
TABLE III.2: Public expenditure by functions and levels of government in %, 1997
central government social security regional government local government
general public services 40 0 15 45
defence 100 0 0 0
public order and safety 67 0 13 21
education 34 1 59 6
research 62 6 32 0
health 24 5 5 03
social security and welfare 88 82 2
housing and community affairs 8 0 21 72
culture and sports 14 2 29 56
economic development 29 15 36 20
Source: Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda - Cuentas de las Administraciones Publicas, here taken
from Vinuela 2000.
This process of devolving spending to regional governments was however not
accompanied by equivalent revenue-raising powers and had to rely on transfers from
the central government. More than 60% of the regional governments’ revenues arise
from taxes and unconditional grants where they have little margin of manoeuvre,
while the remaining part is conditional finance which is earmarked for specific
purposes (Graph III.6). Until the mid-1990s, the decentralisation of tasks created a
tendency to increase deficits at regional and local level. In recent years however,
deficits at regional and local level have been controlled by the central government
through certain provisions and by multi-annual agreements which were co-ordinated –
although not sanctioned - by the Council for fiscal and financial policies (CPFF)
which is composed of representatives from central ministries and the regional
ministries of finance.55













Source: Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda – Informe sobre la Financiacion de las CCAA; here taken
from Vinuela 2000.
Until 2001, the regional financing system was agreed upon by the CPFF in the form
of five-year agreements. For the period 1997-2001, this system has three different
types of regions:
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1. Pais Vasco and Navarra have their own personal and corporate income tax system
and collect most taxes. With the main exception of the social security system
(excluding health) and certain infrastructure networks (ports and airports), they
exercise expenditure powers in most areas. For spending programmes carried out
exclusively by the central government (mainly foreign affairs, defence and some
network infrastructure) they pay a fixed share to the central government which is,
for example, 6.24% of GDP for the Pais Vasco.
2. For the other regions, the “common regime” applies, and grants revenue-raising
powers on a 30% share of the personal income tax revenues and some other taxes,
mainly related to property and property transfers. These account for one-fifth of
their total revenues and half of their unconditional revenues. Regions also have
limited rights to vary rates and deductions on personal income tax, although little
use is made of these rights. Up to now, no regional government has modified the
marginal tax rates, although most have introduced additional deductions, mainly
concerning family and housing allowances. The remaining tax receipts are
attributed to the central government which transfers conditional resources
earmarked for specific purposes and guarantees compensating transfers in case a
region’s personal income tax revenues grow by less than national GDP - although
regions may keep revenues above that benchmark. The main areas of competence
at regional level are education, social services, active labour market policies, some
infrastructure investment and health care.
47 OECD 2000, p.100 and 126ff.56
3. Since the common regime implies that a part of a region’s revenues depends on its
economic performance, Andalucía, Castilla-La Mancha and Extremadura have not
accepted this system. The pre-1997 system continues to apply in these regions
which gives them no taxing powers, but provides for unconditional transfers from
the central government, with amounts calculated on the basis of a range of
different variables related to the cost of activities and their income per capita.
Several more specific problems appear on the revenue side of the regional and local
budgets:
· The asymmetric guarantees of the central government - the growth of tax revenues
of at least nominal GDP growth but never below - introduces disincentives on the
raising of revenues and on the information and transparency for many taxes which
are administered by the regions.
· In view of their smaller income base, poorer regions tend to have more volatile
income tax revenues which are, in addition, pro-cyclical and reinforce cyclical
changes in economic activity.
48 They have therefore a stronger need to take
recourse to debt-financing which is however getting more difficult with the new
draft Law on Budgetary Stability. A more diversified tax base could avoid this
dilemma through increases in the rather low wastewater charges and energy taxes
which would at the same time better internalise externalities and reduce taxation
on labour income by a stricter application of the user/polluter pays principle.
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· In order to reduce the rigidities and the high price levels in the housing market
there is a need to give municipalities access to tax revenues other than those
related to land and real estate.
A new system for the financing of the 15 regions under the common regime starting
in 2002 was agreed in the meeting of the CPFF on 27 July 2001. It replaces the
previous five-year arrangement by a permanent system on the basis of two main
changes: the central government increases its transfers and the regions receive a
higher share and more legislative powers in taxation. For the year 2002, the central
government hands out an additional € 1.8 billion, of which € 565 million is given to
the three regions which have not participated in the previous 5-year scheme
(Andalucía, Extremadura and Castilla-La Mancha); € 745 million is allocated on the
basis of a range of variables the most important of which is population; and € 487
million is provided for health and social services to allow several regions to move
towards taking over full responsibilities in these policies. Further tax revenues are
ceded to the regions which are thus equal to 33% of personal income tax, 35% of
VAT, 40% of special taxes on hydrocarbons, tobacco, alcohol and beer, and 100% of
special taxes on electricity and the registration of vehicles. Moreover, the regions
receive full legislative powers on 30% of the personal income tax and 100% for the
ceded taxes related to culture and legal proceedings.
48 Joumard/Varoudakis 2000, p.40, provide some evidence on the correlation between the growth of
personal income taxes and per capita income.
49 Cf. OECD 2000, p.48f.57
In principle, the process of fiscal decentralisation is to be welcomed since it implies
more incentives and competition between the Spanish regions because their tax
revenues partly depend on their economic performance. Nevertheless, fiscal
responsibility at regional level remains weak for certain taxes, in particular VAT and
special taxes, whose revenues will be pooled and distributed according to a regional
consumption indicator. Furthermore, the legislative powers of regions to vary tax
rates are rather limited. However, there is a general need to find the right balance
between some (richer) regions’ desire for more autonomy and other (poorer) regions’
need for fiscal solidarity and political unity between the different parts of the country.
The principles of financial solidarity across regions and of resource sufficiency for the
provision of public services are explicitly mentioned in the Spanish constitution. Once
more detailed information on the new fiscal system becomes available, its
redistributive effects should be evaluated thoroughly. On the one hand, there is a
greater diversification of the revenues of regional budgets which makes them less
dependent on transfers from the central government and on regional income
developments. On the other hand, given the decentralising elements on the revenue
side of budgets, poorer regions might be confronted with tighter budgetary constraints
for financing the public investment required for their development.
4.2 Regional policy expenditure
In simple terms it can be said that the process of decentralisation and the choice of
policies transferred from the central to the regional level have been inspired by the
priorities of the EU Structural Funds under Objective 1, which are infrastructure,
human capital and support for private investment. At a more detailed level, non-
university education, health policies, social policies (excluding pensions) and
investment in regional infrastructure are managed by the regions in varying degrees.
The so-called “Article 151 regions” (Andalucía, Canarias, Cataluña, Galicia and
Valencia) are more advanced in terms of decentralisation than the so-called “Article
143” regions (Aragón, Asturias, Baleares, Cantabria, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla y
León, Extremadura, Madrid, Murcia, La Rioja) which have asked for more time to
take over certain policies (education until 2001 and health care until 2004). Regional
state aid to the private sector is not particularly high in comparison to the rest of the
EU. On a per capita basis in the eligible regions, the average in the years 1997-99 was
€ 11.3 compared to € 87.4 in the EU15, and it was 0.06 as a % of GDP compared to
0.20% in the EU15. Public employment services and active labour market policies
(ALMP) are managed by the regional governments although legislation and general
decisions are taken by the central government. However, this recent decentralisation
of public employment services has raised concerns about the lack of co-ordination
across regions which may be a problem if information on job vacancies does not flow
across regions.
In Andalucía and Extremadura there are specific programmes for agricultural workers
who are indispensable in seasonal peak times but usually remain unemployed for the
rest of the year. The most important is the “Plan de Empleo Rural” under which they
can get temporary jobs in state-financed infrastructure projects. Having worked for a
certain number of days in this scheme entitles them to unemployment assistance from58
a relatively generous social security scheme for agricultural workers (Box III.1).
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While these unemployed should be included in the unemployment figures of the
labour force survey, this is not the case for registered unemployment figures.
BOX III.1: UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE FOR SEASONAL FARM WORKERS IN ANDALUCÍA AND
EXTREMADURA UNDER THE SPECIAL AGRICULTURAL SCHEME OF SOCIAL SECURITY(REASS)
Unemployed people eligible to assistance under this scheme must be older than 16 and resident in
Andalucía or Extremadura and must have contributed for at least 35 days during the last 12 months to
the special agricultural scheme of social security, including the days worked in public rural
employment programmes. They must not be related to the owner of the agricultural holding where they
had worked and must have a household income of less than 2 to 4 times the minimum wage depending
on the number of household members.
The maximum duration of benefits depends on age and family status. It is 3.43 days per day
contributed to social security for a single person under 25, 180 days for those between 25 and 52, and
300-360 days for those older than 52 depending on their pension status. Benefits amount to 75% to
100% of the minimum wage (which is 433.45 €/month in 2001) plus the social security contributions.
In 2000, the scheme covered 224,200 workers of which 126,300 were women and 149,200 aged
between 25 and 54 years. 195,500 of these were in Andalucía and 28,700 in Extremadura which is
about half of these regions’ total registered unemployment (in which these data are however not
included). The scheme accounts for approximately 5% of total expenditure on unemployment benefits
in Spain.
The Interregional Compensation Fund (Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial;F C I )
provides the regions with funds which are earmarked for investment in productive and
social infrastructure which help to reduce regional income disparities. Based on a law,
it is to amount to 40% of the net public investment of the central government budget.
Only regions receiving EU assistance under Objective 1 are eligible to the FCI, thus
allowing for a close co-ordination with EU Structural Funds and a co-financing of the
projects. Its distribution is based on several (weighted) parameters among which are
income per head, emigration rate over the last 10 years, unemployment rate, regional
area, while insularity and other agreed-upon criteria may correct the outcome. Funds
are transferred from the central government to the 10 Objective 1 regions (excluding
Ceuta y Melilla). On a per capita basis, Extremadura, Galicia and Andalucía are the
main beneficiaries. It accounts for about 2% of the total budgets of the beneficiary
regions under the common regime, but it is slightly more important for some regions
given its redistributive character, reaching up to 3.8% of the 1999 budget of
Extremadura.
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Since the major reform of EU Structural Funds in 1989, Spain has been the main
beneficiary of these funds in absolute terms. In the programming period 1989-1993,
Spain received annual average payments of ECU 2.89 billion, and in the period 1994-
99 about ECU 6 billion (in current prices). Relative to GDP, these payments were up
50 Mauro/Prasad/Spilimbergo 1999, p.37f.
51 Own calculations on the basis of data on the FCI and regional budget plans taken from the Spanish
Ministry for Public Administration (www.map.es)59
to 1.4% and have thus gained a macroeconomic significance (Graph III.7). Almost the
whole country is eligible for assistance for lagging regions (Objective 1), industrial
regions (Objective 2) or rural regions (Objective 5b, now under Objective 2), while
programmes on human resources (Objectives 3 and 4, now only Objective 3) are
applied on a nation-wide basis. In the programming period 2000-2006, the Spanish
Objective 1 regions (including Cantabria as a phasing-out Objective 1 region) will
receive a total of € 39.5 billion allocated on the basis of programmes for each of the
regions and of multi-regional programmes on competitiveness, innovation/R&D, local
development and information society. Objective 2 programmes for the remaining
regions total € 2.75 billion of EU grants, while Objective 3 programmes focussing on
the integration of unemployed people with special difficulties amount to € 2.2 billion.
On the basis of Community Support Frameworks (CSF) for each of the Objectives,
there is a considerable amount of national public and private co-financing of the EU
funding.


























Source: Own calculations based on European Court of Auditors data for EU payments and European
Commission data for GDP.
Given the concentration of funding on Objective 1 regions, the evaluation of the
economic impact of EU Structural Funds has mainly focussed on these programmes
(Box III.2). In spite of rather different methodological approaches, they arrive at
common basic results of positive income and employment effects of the CSFs,
although the employment effects are lower than the income effects because of positive
impacts on labour productivity. A further result is that Structural Funds do not only
provide a stimulus to aggregate demand, but also have continuing supply-side effects
through improvements in productivity and competitiveness.60
BOX III.2: EVALUATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF EU STRUCTURAL FUNDS FOR OBJECTIVE 1
REGIONS IN SPAIN
An aggregate production function approach
De la Fuente (1999) has made a preliminary assessment of the Community Support Framework (CSF)
1994-99 in Spanish Objective 1 regions. Based on an aggregate production function approach and an
employment demand equation he analyses the impact of the induced increases in infrastructure stock,
non-infrastructure capital stock and labour on growth and employment. Assuming that additional
private investment actually corresponds to private co-financing, the CSF’s direct and indirect impact
through infrastructure investment adds 0.63 percentage points to the GDP growth rate and 0.21
percentage points to employment growth; the corresponding figures for non-infrastructure capital are
0.56 and 0.19 percentage points. A more detailed calculation for Andalucía, including expenditure on
training schemes, arrives at a total 1.22 percentage points of GDP growth and 0.40 percentage points of
direct employment growth. A different scenario which estimates induced private investment by taking
account of dead-weight, crowding-out and crowding-in effects arrives at comparable results (1.12 and
0.37). A calculation of the “social rates of return”, defined as the discount rate which makes the present
value of the flow of additional regional income generated by each type of investment equal to the
investment undertaken in the initial year, reveals major differences between the expenditure categories:
40.2% for infrastructure investment, 31.2% for non-infrastructure investment, 13.7% for subsidies and
14.6% for training. Although the reasons for the lower returns on training remain unclear – and
discounting possible methodological and data problems - they may be related to the weak performance
of the labour market until recently which failed to integrate unemployed who have benefited from
training measures.
The HERMIN models
A simulation to evaluate the aggregate macroeconomic impact of the Spanish Objective 1 programmes
from 1989 to 2006 has been made on the basis of the so-called HERMIN model. In order to get
comparable results for the macroeconomic impact of Structural Funds under Objective 1, HERMIN
models have been developed for Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. Each national model consists of
three broad sub-components (a supply side, an absorption side and an income distribution side) which
function as an integrated system of equations. While conventional Keynesian mechanisms are at the
core of the model, the supply sub-component determines output in manufacturing also via price and
cost competitiveness. Interest and exchange rates are exogenous to the model. HERMIN identifies
three channels through which the CSFs affect an economy’s long-run supply potential: through
increased investment in physical infrastructure, through increases in human capital and through direct
assistance to the private productive sector. These channels are introduced into the models in the
standard way (through expenditure and income shocks) and in addition via two types of policy
externalities: The first arises through increased total factor productivity likely to be associated with
improved infrastructure or a higher level of human capital; the second type is associated with the role
of improved infrastructure and training in attracting productive activities through FDI and enhancing
the ability of endogenous industries to compete in the international market.
The table shows the impact of the CSFs (excluding private co-financing) in increasing the level of GDP
and reducing the unemployment rate in all four countries relative to the scenario without CSF.
Compared to the results for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, those for Spain may seem rather low. The
explanation is purely methodological in that the whole territory of Spain is not eligible for Objective 1
assistance while the evaluation of the macroeconomic impact relates to the Spanish economy as a
whole. However, comparing the increase in GDP to the CSF funding, this “multiplier” is largest for
Spain basically because it is a larger economy and has therefore fewer leakage effects into imports. The
figures for the year 2010 point to the supply-side effects of increased productivity and competitiveness
which continue even when the demand-side stimulus of CSF payments is assumed to stop after 2006.61
TABLE: Aggregate CSF impacts on real GDP at market prices (GDP, change in %) and
unemployment rate (UR, change in percentage points), 1989-2010
GDP UR GDP UR GDP UR GDP UR
1989 4.1 -3.2 2.2 -1.4 5.8 -3.6 0.8 -0.5
1993 4.1 -2.9 3.2 -1.0 7.4 -4.1 1.5 -0.8
1999 9.9 -6.2 3.7 -0.4 8.5 -4.0 3.1 -1.6
2006 7.3 -3.2 2.8 0.4 7.8 -2.8 3.4 -1.7
2010 2.4 0.4 2.0 0.5 3.1 -0.1 1.3 -0.4
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain
Source: ESRI; taken from European Commission 2001a, p. 131.
The macroeconomic ex ante evaluation of the CSF 2000-2006
Three different models have been applied to simulate the macroeconomic impact of the CSF 2000-
2006 and are presented in the CSF document. The Spanish government’s MOISEES models simulated
the impact of the CSF mainly on the demand side, although the supply-side effects of an increased
production capacity through a higher capital stock are also taken into account. The HERMIN
simulation differed from the above description only in that it looked at the CSF 2000-2006 in isolation
and not as a continuation of the previous CSFs. The Commission’s QUEST II model confirmed that
long-term effects, which improve the production structure of an economy and are the main objective of
EU Structural Funds, continue to induce a higher level of GDP of somewhat below 1% even when CSF
payments are assumed to stop. However, the QUEST II simulation also suggests that some of the initial
positive effects of the CSF may be reduced by a deterioration of the trade balance and a certain
crowding-out of private investment as a consequence of an appreciation of the real exchange rate and
an increase in real interest rates. According to MOISEES, an annual average of 122,000 jobs is created
due to the CSF while HERMIN arrives at a figure of 219,000.
5. Conclusions and policy options
Spain has made major progress in employment growth and the reduction of
unemployment since the mid-1990s. A major share of this success is due to the efforts
in maintaining macroeconomic stability and reforming labour markets. However, the
reduction in the level of unemployment has not been accompanied by a reduction in
regional disparities in unemployment. The various determinants of this problem and
the range of policies available to address this problem have been discussed in the
preceding analysis.
Unit labour costs in the traded goods sector are more or less the same in regions of
high and of low unemployment. High-unemployment regions should however provide
more moderate wage developments so as to attract more investment and/or to provide
more incentives for geographic mobility of unemployed people. To achieve this, one
option would be a stronger de facto decentralisation of the wage bargaining system by
removing the regional and provincial bargaining levels and having firms opt into
sectoral nation-wide agreements rather than having them justify an opt out. A second
option would be to introduce correction coefficients to take account of regional
differences in prices and purchasing power. The latter could also be applied to
benefits where they are the same across all regions in nominal terms while, due to
lower costs of living in low-productivity regions, they are higher in real terms.62
A particular problem for the flexibility of the labour market are the barriers to
geographic mobility. One of the reasons are the rigidities in the housing market. A
phasing-out of tax incentives to owner-occupied housing and a removal of tax
distortions in the housing market should be envisaged. Moreover, the municipalities
should be accorded a broader tax base, because at present this relies too strongly on
land sales and real estate taxes. Such a change would reduce incentives for urban land
rationing which exerts pressures on the housing situation. An additional problem for
geographic mobility may arise from the decentralisation of public employment
services if the exchange of information on job vacancies is insufficient. A more
general reduction of severance payments on permanent work contracts would also
enhance their relative attractiveness compared to fixed-term contracts which provide
only a weak basis for decisions to move.
The process of fiscal decentralisation has made further progress towards improving
fiscal responsibility and incentives for regions on the revenue side. Increasing
regional competencies on the expenditure side need to be matched by an increased
reliance on regionally and locally raised taxes which are based on a wider basket of
taxes. However, in a context of increased constraints on debt-financing at all levels of
government, an overly strong reliance on taxes depending on income may bring
poorer regions into a vicious circle where they have too little resources for public
investment required for their catching-up. The new system starting in 2002 needs to
be evaluated as to whether an appropriate balance between regional autonomy and a
continuation of fiscal solidarity has been achieved.
Regarding pro-active regional policy, the regions have gained considerable discretion
on the spending of national and EU funding for regional development and labour
market policies. Efficient spending should be based on a clear strategy which defines
the priorities for regional development and job creation. This includes a clear
definition of spatial priorities in terms of both efficiency and equity so that funding is
primarily given to the most efficient projects, many of which are likely to be in the
growth poles of poorer regions, rather than being evenly spread across the territory
with little effect in terms of regional development. A particular problem of regional
policy is the avoidance of dead-weight effects which is a standard problem in direct
aid to the private sector and in job creation schemes.63
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Agriculture, hunting and forestry 254 237 191 131 : : : 202 : : : 111 116 55 62 81 : 155
Fishing 116 66 114 98 : : : 91 : : : 105 101 118 64 179 : 93
Mining and quarrying 80 186 52 83 164 118 137 98 143 56 175 59 113 100 93 49 : 77
Manufacturing 106 101 111 105 87 83 89 108 91 103 95 98 99 98 102 101 64 93
Electricity, gas and water supply 73 76 119 88 68 90 76 111 78 89 61 105 100 148 138 102 : 130
Construction 94 98 108 104 93 97 101 96 103 93 96 104 106 108 102 96 90 89
Wholesale and retail trade; repair
of motor vehicles, motorcycles and
personal and household goods
83 69 127 140 110 85 101 156 96 64 68 125 86 46 91 65 81 47
Hotels and restaurants 123 97 97 100 70 98 83 95 97 65 70 135 80 102 71 78 63 107
Transport, storage and
communication
98 106 98 99 90 87 103 98 106 97 104 101 96 99 103 91 111 103
Financial intermediation 116 87 104 77 83 126 122 97 100 111 120 96 105 113 108 100 71 106
Real estate, renting and business
activities
84 89 88 125 101 85 96 112 84 82 82 107 91 85 92 76 101 102
Public administration and defence;
compulsory social security
98 91 100 98 92 99 101 107 98 103 101 92 100 94 100 103 109 98
Education 100 100 101 98 93 96 103 97 100 100 102 102 101 99 102 99 98 100
Health and social work 99 100 101 98 98 97 101 102 99 100 99 97 102 101 101 100 101 99
Other community, social, personal
service activities
98 99 100 98 95 96 99 102 98 99 98 100 102 99 101 99 102 99
Private households with employed
persons
99 99 101 99 96 98 101 101 100 99 99 99 101 99 101 100 100 99
Total 114 104 107 105 : : : 98 : : : 99 98 89 98 93 : 95
Note: real unit labour costs = real wages over productivity; with prices = regional consumer price index relative to national consumer price index (basis 1992), wages =
compensation per employee and productivity = gross value added (GVA) over employment. Source: Eurostat, own calculations.65
IV. SOUTHERNITALY
1. Introduction
Although Italy’s unemployment rate remains above the EU average, this is in large
part due to high rates of unemployment in the southern regions
52, while
unemployment in the Centre-North is relatively low (Graph IV.1). According to
Labour Force Survey data, regional unemployment rates in 1999 ranged from 4% in
Trentino-Alto Adige, to 29% in Calabria, while the average unemployment rate in the
Centre-North regions was 7%, but the average in the Objective 1 regions was 3 times
higher. Similarly, activity and employment rates are significantly lower in the South
than in the Centre-North.































Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
Recent decades have seen a widening of the gap between the 2 areas, mainly due to a
deterioration in the South’s labour market situation. While unemployment in the
Centre-North fluctuated relatively little in 1983-99, in the South it increased from
12% in 1983 to 20% in 1999. Employment and activity rates also fell in the South, yet
saw only relatively small changes in the Centre-North. Although employment growth
was quite buoyant in Italy in 2000, due to stronger economic growth and greater
labour market flexibility, this was mainly focused in the Centre-North, which saw the
emergence of some labour shortages.
52 The 8 Southern Italian regions are Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Sardegna, Sicilia, Molise
and Abruzzo. The first 6 are Objective 1 regions, while aid to Molise is being ‘phased-out’ and
assistance to Abruzzo was ‘phased out’ in 1994-99. Unless otherwise stated, data in this paper refer to
all 8 Southern Italian regions.66
The following section examines some of the key determinants of the wide dispersion
of regional unemployment rates in Italy, while the third and fourth sections analyse
the impact of national and regional policies on regional unemployment differentials,
and the final section draws some conclusions and points to policy recommendations.
2. Determinants of regional unemployment: some stylised facts
One reason for the high levels of unemployment in the Southern regions is their low
rates of economic growth in recent decades, which has meant that the South’s level of
GDP per capita, relative to the Centre-North, has hardly changed since the early
1970s. Low growth rates may in part be due to the lower level of human capital in the
South. However, unemployment rates are significantly higher at all education levels
in the South, particularly in younger age groups, which suggests that there are
significant problems associated with initial entry to the labour market, and also that
more highly qualified young people in the South may be ‘queuing’ for specific kinds
of jobs. The rise in unemployment rates in the 1970s-90s is also linked to the lack of
wage responsiveness to differences in regional economic conditions, as well as to the
fall in levels of labour mobility since the early 1970s.
2.1 Economic development in Italy’s regions
The level of GDP per capita in the South is around two-thirds of the Italian average
and has seen only minor fluctuations since the early 1970s. The low level of growth in
GDP and productivity over recent decades is a key reason for the South’s persistently
high levels of unemployment (Graph IV.2).
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Source: ISTAT, EUROSTAT.
The only period in the past half-century when the South succeeded in converging
towards the Centre-North’s level of GDP per capita was the 1960s and early 1970s,
due partly to the spread of growth effects from the Centre-North, and partly to slower
population growth in the South, not least as a result of relatively strong labour67
migration. Real GDP growth remained slightly higher in the South than in the Centre-
North in the rest of the 1970s, yet fell behind in the 1980s-90s. Population growth,
however, has been more rapid in the South since the early 1970s, not least due to the
fall in labour mobility.
There are a number of reasons for the South’s slow growth, not least its geographical
peripherality, which leads to poorer market access, and the region’s factor
endowments. The lack of adequate human and physical capital is in part due to the
policy focus on raising levels of household and public sector consumption, rather than
investing in the human and physical capital necessary for fuelling long run growth.
The institutional context of Southern Italy also generates certain disincentives to
private investment, ranging from the lack of secure property rights and the prevalence
of criminality, to the region’s less efficient public services (including transport,
energy and water supply) and a national wage bargaining system which raises unit
labour costs in the South to non-competitive levels.
2.2 Labour force qualifications and sectoral mix
The South’s lower level of education, relative to the Centre-North, may have
contributed to the region’s slower economic development. However, unemployment
in the South is not simply due to a lack of skills, as unemployment rates are high
among people with strong qualifications, particularly in younger age groups. This
may in part be due to a lack of employment opportunities for more educated workers
in the South, due to the region’s sectoral mix.
Although the gap in education levels has narrowed between the South and Centre-
North, the South still lags behind, with 45% of people lacking any secondary
qualification, compared to 42% in Italy as a whole. The lag in levels of human capital
is likely to have contributed to the slower pace of economic development in the South
over a number of decades. The gap is all the more serious given that levels of
education spending throughout Italy are among the lowest in the EU, relative both to
GNP and to total government spending. This suggests that stronger investment in
human capital could enhance prospects for economic growth and consequent
employment creation.
Nevertheless, the South’s relatively lower education levels do not provide an adequate
explanation of the strong regional dispersion of unemployment, not least because the
expected correlation between low skills levels and higher unemployment rates is only
to be found among people aged over 35 years (Table IV.1). There is no such
correlation among younger people, with unemployment rates of around 30% at all
education levels (while in the Centre-North, unemployment is highest among younger
people with no qualifications and those with university degrees). The significant
disparities between younger and older workers may in part be due to the lack of
efficient job search and allocation mechanisms, as well as to stringent employment
protection legislation which deters employers from hiring people with no formal
labour market experience. It also appears, however, that there is a lack of employment
opportunities for more skilled and educated workers in the South and that some young
people, particularly university graduates, are ‘queuing’ for permanent jobs, mainly in
the public sector.68
TABLE IV.1: Unemployment rates by education level and age group, 1997
Aged 25-34 Aged 35-64
SOUTH
University degree 31.4 3.0
Diploma 29.8 5.9
Professional qualification 31.6 9.5
Secondary school certificate 27.4 11.2
No qualifications 35.5 15.2
Total 29.4 9.8
ITALY
University degree 20.4 2.1
Diploma 15.0 3.6
Professional qualification 11.0 4.9
Secondary school certificate 14.6 6.4
No qualifications 26.1 8.5
Total 15.5 5.5
Source: Community Support Framework 2000-2006, Operational Programme “La Scuola per lo
Sviluppo”.
Graph IV.3: Percentage of regional employment by sector, 1998













This tendency to ‘queue’ for permanent jobs is particularly common in the South due
to the sectoral structure of the region’s employment, which is dominated by public
services, agriculture and construction - all sectors strongly dependent on public
transfers. Thus most of the more highly qualified jobs in the South are in the public
sector and, possibly, in traded services (although the share of employment in financial
and business services in lower in the South than in the Centre-North). The most
striking differences between the 2 parts of Italy are in the agricultural and
manufacturing sectors. In 1998, agriculture accounted for 10.2% of employment in
the South and only 3.4% in the Centre-North, whereas manufacturing accounted for
only 13.7% of employment in the South but 26.8% in the Centre-North.69
An analysis of longer-run data
53 reveals both the degree of structural change which
the South has undergone since the 1970s, and also the historic limits of
industrialisation in the region. The share of employment in agriculture in the South
had fallen strongly by the end of the 1990s, from around one third in 1970 (when it
accounted for around 13% of employment in the Centre-North), and it is likely that
workers in this sector will have experienced difficulties in finding alternative
employment. The fall in industry’s share of employment in the South has been less
dramatic because industrialisation remained limited even in the 1970s (when industry
accounted for around 26% of employment, and manufacturing for less than 15%) – in
contrast with a peak of 43% of employment in industry in the Centre-North in 1970,
including 33% in manufacturing. Thus not only has the South seen a significant
structural change in the composition of employment in recent years, but it has been
transformed from a small-scale agricultural economy to an economy dependent on
service sector employment, and largely funded by public transfers.
2.3 Lack of wage responsiveness to regional economic conditions
The level of nominal wages has converged between the South and Centre-North since
the late 1960s, despite significant regional differences in labour productivity. The
subsequent rise in unit labour costs has contributed to the increase in unemployment
in the South, even though the state has attempted to reduce the South’s disadvantage
by means of subsidies on social security contributions. The convergence of regional
wages, combined with the lower cost of living in the South, has also been a key factor
in reducing labour mobility from southern to northern regions.
The differential in nominal wages between the South and Centre-North changed
significantly between 1960 and 1980, following the introduction of centralised wage
bargaining mechanisms. While wages in the South were around half of the Centre-
North level in 1960, they rose to around 90% by the early 1980s, and this ratio has
remained relatively unchanged ever since
54. This shift hindered the growth of
manufacturing in the South and, indeed, contributed to the reduction in its share of
employment, as companies have either closed down operations or have restructured,
investing in capital in order to be able to reduce employment.
Although there is some degree of regional variation in nominal manufacturing wages
(Table IV.2), this is largely due to sectoral differences between the South and Centre-
North. Moreover, the regional differential in nominal manufacturing wages is not
sufficient to compensate for the stronger differences in labour productivity between
regions, which widened in the 1960s-90s because productivity increased less rapidly
in the South than in the Centre-North. Unit labour costs in the South have converged
towards the Italian average; in 1998, unit labour costs in the Objective One regions
(i.e. excluding Abruzzo) stood at 100.5% of the Italian average in the manufacturing
sector. However, this convergence in levels of unit labour costs has been achieved by
53 Svimez 2000.
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means of significant state subsidies for employment, not least in terms of reduced
social security contributions
55. Nevertheless, even with these subsidies, the effects of
regional wage equalisation has had a detrimental effect on employment in the South.
(Annex IV provides details of unit labour costs in all sectors.)
TABLE IV.2: Gross nominal wages in the South divided by total workforce, Italy=100
1995 1996 1997 1998
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing 133.1 132.6 130.8 127.9
Industry 89.0 89.6 88.9 88.2
of which manufacturing 85.0 86.3 85.9 85.2
Construction 99.2 99.0 101.1 101.4
Business and financial services 85.5 85.1 87.3 86.7
Other traded services 82.5 83.5 85.8 85.5
Non traded services 104.0 104.7 104.2 104.1
Total 91.9 92.5 93.0 92.5
Source: ISTAT, calculations by DG ECFIN.
As the cost of living is also lower in the South, the imbalance is even stronger in
terms of real wages. A recent study calculates that the accumulated difference in
prices between North and South in 1947-95 was over 14%
56.E v e ni fn o m i n a l
producer wages are higher in some sectors in the Centre-North, the differential in
terms of the real consumer wage is much smaller and may indeed favour the South in
sectors such as the public administration, thus acting as a disincentive to labour
mobility.
Finally, the relatively high level of the producer wage in the South may contribute to
the growth of the informal economy, as businesses seek to remain competitive by
undercutting the wage levels agreed via the national bargaining process. The OECD
57
estimates that the informal economy accounts for one third of total employment in the
South and over 40% of industrial employment (compared to around 20% in Italy as a
whole). It is therefore likely that a proportion of the people who are registered as
unemployed are in fact employed in the informal sector. The scale of the informal
economy may in part be due to national factors, such as stringent employment
protection legislation and the relatively high tax wedge on labour. However, the far
greater prevalence of the informal economy in the South suggests that region-specific
factors are also important, not least the lack of wage responsiveness to local economic
conditions.
55 OECD 2000a p.153.
56 Alesina/Danninger/Rostagno 1999.
57 OECDa 2000 p.129.71
2.4 Insufficient labour mobility
Labour migration from the South to the Centre-North was relatively high from the
1950s to the early 1970s but then started falling and has remained low ever since. By
the mid 1990s, the ratio of gross migration flows to population was lower in Italy than
in any other OECD country, and inter-regional commuting is also very limited
58.T h e
lack of labour mobility is due to a number of factors, particularly the move towards
nominal wage convergence in the late 1960s, the increase in state transfers to the
South, the rise in the fixed costs associated with migration, and the lack of effective
job-matching mechanisms.
The convergence of nominal wages across regions in the late 1960s reduced
incentives to migrate by raising the level of reservation wages and household
disposable income in the South
59. Further disincentives to migrate were generated by
the increase in real per capita transfers to the South in the 1960s-90s, which led to a
rise in levels of household consumption. Moreover, as these transfers primarily take
the form of pensions, and there is no minimum income scheme for people with no
formal employment record, this increase may have reinforced the dependence of
young people on informal family networks, thus reducing their propensity to migrate.
Incentives to migrate may also have been affected by a rise in the fixed costs
associated with migration, due to the more rapid rise in the cost of living in the
Centre-North, and increased rigidities in the housing market
60. Similarly, the costs and
difficulties associated with finding accommodation may mean that migration is
facilitated by interpersonal links in the host region, so that long periods of low
migration may lead to hysteresis effects, raising the effective cost of migrating
61.T h e
importance of informal connections is also likely to be all the more important due to
the historical lack of efficient formal job search mechanisms in the form of public and
private employment agencies providing advisory services to unemployed people, as
well as information on job opportunities throughout Italy.
3. Regional incidence of national policies
Specific aspects of the national institutional and policy context can have spatially
differentiated effects and may thus contribute to the strong regional dispersion of
unemployment in Italy. Of particular importance are policies relating to the
macroeconomic context and to interpersonal redistribution, as well as taxation on
capital and labour. Moreover, although various measures have been undertaken in
recent years aimed at increasing the efficiency of Italy’s product, capital and labour
markets, there are still a number of features of the labour and housing markets which




tend to exert a negative influence on regional unemployment rates by affecting
regions’ attractiveness to private capital and the extent of interregional labour
mobility.
3.1 Macroeconomic policies and interpersonal redistribution
Italy’s macroeconomic context worsened from the 1970s until the early 1990s, with
rises in inflation and in public sector indebtedness. There have been significant
improvements in the country’s macroeconomic stability in the 1990s, yet the
challenge now is to maintain this stability, while also raising levels of public
investment in the South in order to stimulate growth. Such a strategy will require
fiscal responsibility by regional and local authorities, as well as by the central state,
and may also involve a re-balancing of the relative policy emphasis on consumption
and investment spending in the South.
Public finances deteriorated throughout the 1970s-80s and into the early 1990s, with
the general government deficit rising from 3.3% of GDP in 1970 to a peak of 12.5%
of GDP in 1985, before falling gradually. The strongest reduction occurred in 1997,
when the general government deficit fell to 2.7% of GDP, from 7.1% of GDP in 1996,
following significant efforts to consolidate public finances by reducing spending and
increasing fiscal receipts. The shift in the fiscal stance has also led since 1995 to a
reduction in the gross public debt, which had risen consistently from 38.0% of GDP in
1970, to 123.8% of GDP in 1994. However, the level of the gross public debt remains
high, at 114.5% of GDP in 1999.
TABLE IV.3: Per capita investment and consumption in the South, Italy=100
1995 1996 1997 1998
Public and private
investment
69.0 68.3 72.5 71.9
Public and private
consumption
83.0 82.5 82.2 82.2
Consumption of
households
78.1 77.2 76.8 76.5
Consumption of public
administration
99.5 99.9 100.3 101.1
GVA at factor cost 65.9 65.8 66.5 66.3
Source: ISTAT, Eurostat, DG ECFIN calculations.
A key reason for the increases in public sector indebtedness from the 1970s was the
rise in public spending in the Southern regions, despite their limited fiscal capacity
62.
A recent study estimates that per capita tax revenues in most southern regions were
only around 60% of the Italian average in 1983-92
63. This is in part due to the low
level of economic activity, but is also related to the progressiveness of the tax system,
62 European Commission 1993.
63 Decressin 1999.73
the South’s exemptions from specific forms of taxation (e.g. relief on social security
contributions), and tax evasion via the informal economy. The same study shows that,
despite the gap in fiscal capacity, per capita levels of public consumption in the South
were around the national average, while per capita levels of social benefits were
around 85% of the national level. The additional financing of household consumption
and public services was provided in the form of state transfers, which contributed
significantly to the accumulation of national public sector indebtedness.
Notable efforts have been made to consolidate public finances since the mid 1990s,
and this has included some reduction in public spending in the South. This strategy
has laid the foundations for consistent, long-run growth throughout Italy, and
provided the basis for stronger employment creation in 2000, although primarily in
the Centre-North. However, the reduction in public investment and the loss of
employment in public enterprises has led to increased unemployment in specific
localities. Efforts are now needed to maintain macroeconomic stability, while also
raising levels of public investment in the South, with the aim of increasing
productivity and boosting the region’s attractiveness to private investment.
On the one hand, ongoing fiscal consolidation will depend on the active commitment
of local and regional authorities, which have gained greater fiscal autonomy since the
late 1990s. Significant problems have arisen in the past, with overruns on spending,
particularly in relation to health services for which the Regions are responsible. An
Internal Stability Pact has therefore been agreed between the state and the regional
and local authorities aimed at ensuring fiscal responsibility (Box IV.1).
BOXIV.1: INTERNAL STABILITYPACT
The Internal Stability Pact was agreed at the end of 1998 and set targets for improving the fiscal
balance of the regional, provincial and municipal authorities in 1999-2001. Revised targets were later
set for 2001-03, as it was estimated that half of the targeted savings were not achieved in 1999.
Changes were also made in relation to definitions and mechanisms for assessing compliance. However,
the IMF
64 notes a number of factors which may limit the Pact’s effectiveness. The first is the lack of
effective sanctions. The second is that targets are not set in relation to each authority’s existing net
borrowing, but rather in relation to its level of primary current expenditure. The third is the use of
different targets from those monitored in Italy’s Stability Programme and specifically the exclusion of
investment spending from the terms of the Pact, even though this is the only type of expenditure for
which the regions are allowed to borrow.
On the other hand, it may only be possible to raise public investment significantly in
the South if consumption spending is reduced. Despite some reductions in public
spending in the 1990s, net imports into the South were around 17% of southern GDP
in 1995-98 (Graph IV.4). This is primarily due to relatively higher levels of public
consumption and employment in the South, as well as to relatively high welfare
payments to individuals. By contrast, the share of investment in regional GDP is not
significantly higher in the South than in the Centre-North, because the main focus of
64 IMF 2000.74
policy has been to promote convergence of household and public sector consumption
across regions, rather than to stimulate catching up in terms of productivity and real
GDP per capita.
A recent study has emphasised the role of public employment as a hidden form of
redistributive transfer to the South
65. Levels of public employment are higher in the
South than in the Centre-North, whether scaled relative to regional GDP,
consumption, labour force, total employment or population. Moreover, public sector
jobs tend to have higher wages than comparable jobs in the private sector in the
South, for example in financial, business and personal services. Thus it is not simply
the case that public consumption accounts for a higher share of GDP in the South due
to its low level of GDP per capita, or due to the political commitment to maintaining
equal public services in all regions. Rather, a key reason for the high level of public
consumption in the South is the relatively higher levels of public employment.
















Source: ISTAT, DG ECFIN calculations.
The Southern regions also receive significant interpersonal transfers, which raise
levels of household consumption. However, welfare payments mainly take the form
of old-age and invalidity pensions, which together account for 70% of spending.
Benefits with a relatively high replacement rate (80% of the previous wage) are
available to workers laid off by firms covered by the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni –
namely medium-sized or large industrial, construction and commercial firms.
However, few benefits are available to individuals with little or no formal labour
market experience. Moreover, many people laid off from restructuring companies
have been allocated invalidity pensions, which have the effect of raising the
reservation wage in the South, not only among recipients, but also among other
household members because income from pensions is redistributed within the
household. For example, younger people are less likely to migrate in search of work
65 Alesina/Danninger/Rostagno 1999.75
as they would no longer live in a household with a high level of consumption –
particularly as there is no income support for first-time job-seekers.
3.2 Taxes on capital and labour
The tax system has proved unfavourable to private sector investment and labour
market participation in recent decades, not only due to frequent increases in taxes on
capital and labour, but also due to the complexity of rules which increases
uncertainty. Policy-makers now face the dual challenge of reducing the tax burden,
particularly on labour, while also ensuring that revenues are sufficient to continue to
reduce public sector indebtedness. The need to cut the tax burden is especially strong
in the South, where fiscal incentives on labour are due to be lowered significantly in
2001.
Although Italy’s total tax burden was below the EU average from the mid 1960s to
the mid 1990s, its level rose more rapidly than in most other EU Member States so
that, by 1995, it exceeded the EU average (Graph IV.5). Tax increases affected all
main tax bases, but particularly taxes on income and profits, and social security
contributions. The share of tax revenue in GDP peaked in 1997, at 44.2% of GDP,
compared to the EU15 average of 41.1%.
The 1997-98 tax reform reduced the tax wedge on labour, with the aim of reducing
incentives to employment creation, and also cut taxes on capital, with a view to
stimulating investment. However, although the tax wedge on labour has been reduced,
particularly for workers on lower wages, the overall tax burden remains heavy, not
least due to high social security contributions.
















Moreover, even in 1999 the marginal tax rate facing the principal earner in Italian
households was relatively high (although lower for the second earner in the
household), and this may act as a disincentive to labour market participation. The
marginal tax rate does not vary according to the type of household (e.g. single or
married, with or without children), although it falls from 40% to 34% for the principal76
earner in households earning less than two thirds of the average production worker’s
wage
66. The marginal tax rate facing the second earner is lower, ranging from 22% in
households earning around the average of the production worker’s wage, to 34% in
high income households.
Various forms of tax relief and credits have been provided in the South since the late
1960s with the aim of reducing disincentives to investment and employment (Box
IV.2). Intervention has traditionally taken the form of relief on social security
contributions, although more recently tax credits have been introduced.
BOXIV.2: TAXRELIEF ANDTAXCREDITS IN SOUTHERNITALY
Specific schemes of relief on social security contributions for companies in the South date back to the
late 1960s. Employers’ contributions to the main welfare and social security schemes (sgravi degli
oneri sociali) were reduced in 1968, while exemptions were also introduced for a number of additional
contributions, for example for healthcare (fiscalizzazione oneri sociali). However, new instruments
have been developed since the mid 1990s
67, as the European Commission has ruled that region-specific
forms of tax relief constitute a form of state aid which distorts competition between Member States:
· Various contributions have been abolished and replaced by the new regional tax, IRAP, so that
exemptions for the South no longer apply.
· Relief on employers’ mainstream social security contributions in the South is due to end in 2001.
· New nationwide schemes of relief on social security contributions have been introduced e.g. for
newly employed part-time workers.
· Relief on social security contributions is available for 5 years to companies leaving the informal
sector, and is expected to see a higher rate of take-up in the South due to the larger size of its
informal sector.
· Tax credits have been introduced for companies investing or employing new workers, particularly
in the South and the ‘depressed areas’ of the Centre-North.
3.3 The functioning of markets
Various reforms have been introduced to the regulation of Italy’s labour market in
recent years, notably measures aimed at removing restrictions on part-time and fixed
term contracts, and these have contributed to more rapid employment growth,
primarily in the Centre-North. However, there are a number of features of the Italian
labour market which create disincentives to employment. While some aspects appear
to have similar impacts across all regions – such as stringent employment protection
legislation – others have region-specific effects, notably the national wage bargaining
system and the lack of effective job allocation mechanisms.
66 OECD 2001a.
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Italy’s wage bargaining system has specific negative effects in the Southern regions
(Box IV.3). Since the late 1960s, the system has produced national agreements on
nominal wage levels which do not reflect regional differences in productivity or living
costs. This has acted as a disincentive to private investment in the South, as well as to
labour migration from South to North, and has thus been an important contributory
factor to the rise in unemployment in the South.
Some changes to the wage bargaining system were introduced in the early 1990s, so
that a 2-tier system now operates, with firms able to raise wages above the level set in
the national agreements, as long as specific targets for productivity or profitability
have been met. Although these reforms have been important in ensuring wage
moderation in the context of the state’s disinflation strategy, no significant move has
been made to allow greater regional wage differentiation. Temporary derogations
from national wage agreements are, however, sanctioned in a limited number of local
areas, mainly in the South, via the contratti d’area initiative.
A second source of region-specific inefficiency in the labour market is the lack of
effective formal job allocation mechanisms. A very low share of new job placements
are arranged via public employment centres in Italy, compared to countries such as
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK
68. Moreover, unemployment rates among
young people are significantly higher throughout Italy, but particularly in the South,
suggesting that job-matching mechanisms are weak for people with no labour market
experience. Public employment centres have tended to focus on collecting
employment statistics, rather than providing advice and information to unemployed
people. However, private employment agencies have been introduced since 1998, and
the public employment service is also in the process of reform.
BOXIV.3: THE WAGE-SETTINGSYSTEM
· In 1946, the wage indexation system (scala mobile) was introduced. In addition to any negotiated
wage increases, the scala mobile automatically indexed wages to any rise in the national cost of
living – to the greater benefit of workers in regions with smaller rises in inflation. Moreover, rises
in the price level automatically fed back into wage increases, thus leading to inflationary spirals.
· In 1961-69, the system of wage cages (gabbie salariali) reduced sectoral wage differences
between regions by limiting disparities in regional wages to a maximum of 20%.
· In 1969, a system of national agreements was introduced which set national wage floors for each
sector, applied equally across all regions.
· In the 1980s, reforms led to greater wage differentiation across sectors and professions, although
not across regions.
· In 1992-93, the scala mobile was abolished, and the Incomes Policy Accord set up a 2 tier wage
bargaining system. First, national sectoral agreements are negotiated for 2 years in the case of
wages, and for 4 years in the case of working conditions. Wage increases are set within the upper
limit of the government’s projections for consumer-price inflation. Second, individual firms may
agree higher wage increases on the basis of productivity or profitability targets.
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Responsibility for the public employment service has been reallocated from the
provinces to the regions, and new employment centres are being set up. Reforms
include the provision of tailored advice to unemployed people, as well as a national
information system with details on job vacancies throughout Italy. The basic features
of the reform should be in place by the end of 2003, and finalised by 2006. However,
the National Action Plan for Employment 2001 shows that the reform is generally
proceeding less rapidly in the South, and that specialised advisory services are more
likely to be available in the Centre-North.
There are also a number of constraints on the housing market, with strong regulation
of the private rented sector, and high transactions costs on house purchases. In the
1970s-80s, house sales were further muted by the combination of high interest rates
and the limited availability of mortgage finance. The sluggish housing market creates
disincentives to migration and may thus contribute to the strong regional dispersion of
unemployment.
Regulation of the private rented sector increased in 1978, with the Fair Rent Act
(Equo Canone) which introduced rent controls, establishing a formula for rent-setting,
and stipulating a rental contract length of 4 years, after which either the landlord or
the tenant was free to decide not to renew the lease. This led both to a fall in housing
rents relative to blue collar wages, and to a reduction in the supply of rented
accommodation. The private rented sector remains constrained, even though opt-outs
from the Equo Canone were introduced in 1992, both for newly constructed
accommodation and for leases agreed with associations of house owners and tenants.
One consequence of the introduction of rent controls was a further shift towards
owner-occupied accommodation, whose share of housing rose to 67% in 1990 (above
the EU average of 56%)
69. However, house purchasing is subject to significant
transactions costs, with stamp duty of 8% on all purchases, as well as 4% VAT on
new homes. The mortgage market was also negatively affected in the 1970s-80s by
high inflation and high nominal interest rates, so that house purchases have often been
undertaken with own funds, rather than via borrowing.
4. The effects and efficiency of regional policies
Although Italy has undertaken regional policy for a number of decades, in the form
both of interregional fiscal transfers and proactive regional policies, the benefits in
terms of higher growth and employment creation are far from clear. Indeed, the policy
emphasis on raising levels of household and public sector consumption, rather than on
investing in human and physical capital, may have hindered the South’s economic
development. Similarly, some of the strategic decisions made in the sphere of
proactive regional policy, as well as the mismanagement of funds, have reduced the
effectiveness of policy intervention.
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4.1 Explicit fiscal transfers to the regions
The Regions are responsible for a range of executive tasks, such as healthcare,
training and regional transport, and were until recently financed almost entirely from
state transfers, although the Special Statute Regions
70 also received shares of national
taxes. Transfers were used to ensure that there was little regional variation in per
capita levels of public sector consumption, despite significant regional disparities in
per capita gross value added. Although the system of regional finance has been
redesigned since 1997, with a significant increase in the Regions’ own revenues, state
transfers are still used to ensure that differences in regional levels of public sector
consumption are limited.
Following the establishment of the Ordinary Statute Regions in the early 1970s, a
range of executive responsibilities was transferred to the regional level. Regions were
largely financed by transfers from the central state, although they also had minimal
own revenues and could borrow for investment purposes. The aim was to ensure that
public services were financed equally across all regions, regardless of their varying
fiscal capacities, so that per capita levels of public consumption have differed little
between the Centre-North and South.
The system of regional financing was reformed in the 1990s, and own revenues now
account for around 70% of Regions’ current spending
71. The most important source of
regional revenue is the Imposta Regionale sulle Attività Produttive (IRAP), a regional
tax on productive activities, which was introduced in 1997-98, replacing a number of
minor taxes. IRAP is levied on the value added of enterprises, partnerships and self-
employed people, and in 1998 accounted for 74% of the regions’ own tax revenue, or
2.2% of GDP. A second important innovation in 1997-98 was the addition of a flat
rate regional tax to the national personal income tax, with the tax rate set by each
region within specific limits (initially 0.5% and 0.9%). The Regions are also allocated
(shares of) other tax bases, such as the motor vehicles tax, a share of the revenue from
excise duty on petrol, and (since 1999) a share of revenue from value added tax. The
state still provides transfers to the poorer regions, but with the aim of compensating
them for their lower level of own revenues, rather than as the main source of
financing.
An equalisation fund has also been set up, although it redistributes finance only
between the 15 Ordinary Statute Regions, and draws only on 40% of the national
VAT revenues in these Regions
72. Equalisation is based on a formula which takes into
account each region’s population size, differences in the regions’ fiscal capacity (the
70 The 5 Special Statute Regions (Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardegna, Sicilia, Trentino Alto Adige, and
Valle d’Aosta) have greater autonomy and were set up in the late 1940s, whereas the 15 Ordinary
Statute Regions were established in the early 1970s.
71 IMF 2000.
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‘solidarity coefficient’) and the regional need for healthcare. The application of the
formula is being introduced gradually in 2001-2014.
The main function of these changes in the structure of regional finance is to enhance
regional autonomy – particularly for the richer Regions – and to increase the
transparency of interregional transfers, whether via the central state or via the
equalisation fund. In the longer run, these changes may also lead to a wider
differential in levels of public consumption between the South and Centre-North, due
to differences in per capita income and economic activities. However, this may not
imply that public spending in the South will be rebalanced in favour of public
investment, so that additional forms of policy intervention may be needed,
specifically aimed at stimulating the South’s economic development.
4.2 Regional policy expenditure
Although proactive regional policy in Southern Italy has a long history, dating back to
at least 1950, its success has been limited. This is in part due to the relatively low
level of proactive regional spending in comparison with expenditure aimed at
equalising consumption across regions. However, regional policy has also been
characterised by a number of weaknesses, not least the frequent changes in both
strategy and institutions. Poor strategic decisions have also been made, notably the
emphasis on industrialising via public enterprises and the ongoing focus on state aids.
Finally, public funds have not always been well-managed, due to complex
bureaucratic procedures and sometimes to corruption.
Regional policy has undergone numerous shifts since the 1950s, when it focused on
agricultural restructuring and the construction of basic infrastructure. In the early
1960s, the emphasis moved to the use of financial incentives to promote industrial
development in designated growth poles. By the end of the 1960s, however, the
industrialisation strategy was mainly being pursued by public enterprises and, when
these experienced difficulties from the mid 1970s, the policy focus shifted once more,
this time towards promoting SMEs and the ‘industrial districts’ seen to underpin the
growth of North-eastern Italy. By the early 1990s, efforts were being made to reduce
public indebtedness, leading to the privatisation and restructuring of public
enterprises, as well as cut-backs in state aids and public investment. A further new
economic development strategy for the South was launched in 1999, aimed at
stimulating a shift in supply-side conditions via economic reforms and investment in
physical, human and knowledge capital
73.
The strategy of promoting industrialisation via the expansion of public enterprises and
state aids, particularly in the 1960s-80s, did not prove successful. Since the 1970s,
state aids have accounted for a large share of regional expenditure - for example, over
40% of EU structural aid to Italy in 1976-99 – despite questions over the efficiency
and effectiveness of these instruments. State aids have strong dead-weight effects and
also tend to promote capital-intensive forms of economic activity. Moreover, their
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efficiency in southern Italy has been undermined by the use of discretionary allocation
mechanisms, and by the lack of project monitoring. Although the level of state aid fell
in Italy in the 1990s, region-specific state aid (which is mainly allocated to the South)
remains the highest in the EU-15 relative to GDP
74.
Particularly in the 1970s-80s, a large share of state aids was allocated to public
enterprises, which had come to be seen as a means of promoting economic
development in the South, rather than simply as suppliers of products and services.
Public enterprises allocated around 40-50% of their total investment to the South in
the 1960s and early 1970s, although this fell to around 30% by the mid 1980s
75.B y
the late 1970s, the profitability of many public enterprises had deteriorated, partly due
to their concentration in energy-intensive and structurally declining sectors, such as
steel, but also due to the imbalance between labour costs and productivity. However,
public enterprises continued to receive state aids, thus feeding public sector
indebtedness, and, by the end of the 1980s, they accounted for 15% of non-
agricultural employment in Italy
76. Thus when privatisation and restructuring
programmes were finally introduced in the 1990s, the costs in terms of job losses and
enterprise closures were significant.
Much of the finance for proactive regional policy in Southern Italy since the 1970s
has taken the form of EU structural aid (Graph IV.6). Italy benefited from 20-25% of
EU structural aid in 1976-89 and, although its share of payments fell in the 1990s, it
remains the second largest recipient after Spain, allocated 15.5% of funds for
Objectives One, 2 and 3 in 2000-2006. As well as significant funds for the southern
Objective One regions, Italy also receives additional EU structural aid for areas in the
Centre-North under Objective 2, as well as finance for labour market programmes
under Objective 3 (Table IV.4).
TABLE IV.4: EU Structural aid to Italy in 2000-2006
Objective 1 Objective 2 Objective 3 Total
€ million at
1999 prices
22122 2522 3744 29656
Percentage
of total
16.3 11.2 15.6 15.2
Notes: Data for Objectives One and 2 include ‘phasing out’ regions. Total includes the Community
Initiatives, Innovative Actions, and aid for Fisheries interventions outside the Objective One regions.
Source: European Commission.
74 European Commission 2001.
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Source: Own calculations based on Court of Auditors data.
The effectiveness of proactive regional policy in southern Italy has, however, been
undermined by numerous institutional changes, particularly since the late 1970s, as
well as by inefficient management, complex bureaucratic procedures and, sometimes,
by corruption and the misallocation of funds. As a consequence, the quality (and
sometimes quantity) of public services, in areas such as local transport, water and
energy supply, is significantly poorer than in the Centre-North, despite many years of
public investment in the South’s physical capital.
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations
Italy has made progress in recent years in improving macroeconomic stability, in
opening up product markets to competition and in increasing labour market flexibility.
These reforms provide the basis for enhanced growth throughout Italy, and ongoing
efforts are needed to maintain and pursue these strategies. However, policy
intervention is also needed in other areas in order to promote growth and to raise
employment creation, not least by increasing the South’s attractiveness to private
capital, and by removing obstacles to labour mobility.
The first challenge is to increase the attractiveness of the southern regions to private
investment. While the government’s commitment to raising productivity in the South
by means of public investment in human and physical capital is to be welcomed, this
must not be at the expense of recent gains in macroeconomic stability, and may thus
imply the need to adjust the balance between public current and capital spending in
the South. Action is also needed in a number of other areas in order to reduce the
significant disincentives to private investment in the South:
· The wage bargaining system should be reformed to allow wage levels to respond
to differences in regional labour productivity levels and living costs. This reform
is of particular importance given that the high levels of social security subsidies
granted to the South since the late 1960s are due to end in 2001.83
· The ending of social security subsidies also emphasises the need to reduce further
the tax burden on labour, in terms of both payroll taxes and social security
contributions, within the limits set by the necessity of fiscal discipline. One means
of reducing the budgetary impact of tax cuts would be to target tax reductions at
the lower end of the wage scale. This should be of particular benefit to the South,
where the sectoral mix is such that wages are somewhat lower than in the Centre-
North.
· Major efforts are also required to improve the institutional context for investment.
This not only includes measures aimed at enhancing the efficiency of the public
administration and public services, but also intervention to tackle organised
criminality and the lack of secure property rights. Action is also needed to reduce
the scale of the informal economy in southern Italy, which is at present
encouraged by the lack of regional wage differentiation and high labour taxes.
· The effectiveness of regional policy must also be enhanced by ensuring that funds
are well-managed, and that monitoring and evaluation procedures are improved. A
consistent long-term strategy of investment in human and physical capital is
needed, but spending on state aids should be reduced further, due to its potential
dead-weight effects.
The second challenge is to reduce disincentives to labour mobility, which is among
the lowest in the EU-15, in terms of both migration and commuting. Not only would
this reduce unemployment in the South, but it should also raise Italy’s aggregate
growth rate, by reducing labour market bottlenecks in the Centre-North. Moreover,
southern Italy is unlikely to see convergence towards the Centre-North in terms of
GDP per capita in the absence of increased migration. Action is needed in the
following areas:
· The reform of the public employment service should be accelerated in order to
improve the quality and efficiency of formal job allocation mechanisms,
particularly for matching job seekers and vacancies across regions.
· Disincentives to mobility are created by the policy emphasis on raising nominal
household consumption in the South, despite large differences in regional fiscal
capacity and in the cost of living. Efforts should be made to reform the welfare
system, with invalidity pensions being replaced by conventional unemployment
benefits which are conditional on active job search. The possibility of reducing the
South’s high levels of public employment should also be investigated, as it acts as
a hidden form of social transfer, providing incentives for ‘wait’ unemployment.
· Action is also needed to reduce rigidities in the housing market, both by lowering
levels of transaction costs on house purchases, and by easing regulation of the
private rented sector in order to stimulate the supply of private rented
accommodation.84
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ANNEXIV: UNIT LABOUR COSTS BY REGION AND SECTOR, 1998 (ITALY= 100)




94.1 199.7 59.2 56.0 151.3 83.1 96.9 112.5 84.8 103.5 96.0 88.4 74.3 187.2 132.5 128.1 136.2 165.2 114.5 113.2 128.6
Industry 102.4 101.3 107.3 97.6 96.8 101.4 104.7 103.3 98.2 105.0 110.1 98.0 103.5 93.7 102.5 101.1 85.9 84.2 87.3 92.7 95.8
Manufac-
turing
100.5 119.3 113.5 98.1 95.0 98.8 102.8 100.1 97.0 105.2 107.0 100.9 103.3 93.6 104.8 102.0 86.3 92.9 93.0 97.8 99.4
Construc-
tion
99.0 124.2 129.1 115.7 91.7 93.8 110.1 105.8 107.6 121.1 100.1 92.6 127.8 107.8 90.5 107.5 93.7 88.7 80.0 78.5 89.5




99.2 76.7 95.2 113.2 120.7 98.0 117.1 113.7 117.5 99.5 100.4 123.4 96.1 71.8 71.1 72.8 69.7 63.6 65.5 71.1 69.2
Other traded
services
95.6 80.0 88.0 102.4 78.9 95.6 95.7 97.5 104.2 95.0 98.3 86.6 106.1 103.9 107.3 117.6 103.0 108.6 112.7 105.0 110.6
Non traded
services




119.7 71.2 67.1 144.3 87.4 117.1 75.8 122.5 97.3 94.2 119.3 52.9 100.0 89.1 132.6 107.2 123.9 120.3 98.7 91.7 111.3
Education 112.0 129.1 135.9 113.3 94.1 113.8 128.1 138.5 110.9 110.7 112.3 99.2 94.2 98.5 72.0 79.3 61.2 74.1 81.6 88.5 77.5
Health and
social work
91.3 111.0 83.9 105.6 91.6 97.1 82.2 91.6 106.9 97.6 93.8 131.9 94.8 87.5 101.0 96.8 87.7 95.8 96.4 77.1 95.5
Total 97.6 106.5 97.7 95.2 100.4 97.4 103.0 99.4 99.7 100.8 102.7 100.1 106.6 114.4 107.9 105.9 106.5 104.2 102.6 104.6 105.5
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat, ESA95.